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A sample of 210 university student~ were clustered into relatively homo-
genous religious orientations, based on their scores on three scales of 
religious involvement, delineated·by Hunt (1972): Literal, Anti-literal 








Thouless (1935): Intensity of Belief Scale; 
Rokeach (1960): Dogmatism Scale; 
16 PF by Cattell et al. (1970) and 
King and Hunt (1972 b): Scales fqr Basic Religious Dimensions. 
Hunt's notion that pro-religious subjects of different.involvement might 
differ in terms of personality variables was supported. The Literal in-
. volvement group further held their religious beliefs with a higher degree 
of conviction and participated more in religious activities than the Mytho-















Many definitions and classifications have been suggested for measuring 
religious involvement. Allport (1950, 1954, 1966), with his intrinsic 
and extrinsic dimensions, one of the earlier researchers, influenced this 
area of research most. Subsequently many more attempts were made to clarify 
this area by others such as Broen (1957), Lenski (1961), Glock and Stark 
(1965), Allen and Spilka (1967), Dittes (1971), Himmelfarb (1975) and 
others. The research in this area has been greatly restricted by pro-
blems of inadequate definitions and classifications. 
Problems with definitions have generally been that either researchers 
have not defined religious involvement or that they derived their defi-
nitions from the dimensions of involvement that they outlined. This has 
obscured what is being classified and has led to dubious dimensions. 
Under religious involvement we understand the degree to whi~h a person's 
religion occupies his interests, beliefs, or activities. Therefore, it 
is obvious that measures of religious involvement should not include 
variables in other domains of attitude or conduct that are thought to 
be a consequence of religious involvement. Glock and Stark (1965) err 
in this way by including a consequential dimension which measures the 
effects of religious involvement upon other things, e.g. prejudice. 
Under problems of classifications it is clear that some dimensions are 
not mutually exclusive, in the sense that there should only be one place 
for an item within a given classification. King and Hunt (1972b) use the 
same variables more than once to construct different scales. The corre-
lations between these particular scales manifest the problem. Early 












Lenski (1961), and others, simply lacked sufficient categories to be 
exhaustive. Another difficulty with some of the classifications lies 
in the fact that they do not use temporally related phenomena. Religious 
knowledge, for example, is included by many (Clayton, 1971; Faulkner, 
and De Jong, 1966; Glock and Stark, 1965; King and Hunt, l972a) as a 
measure of religious involvement. However, knowledge depends on many 
things, particularly one's ability to retain information., and is, there-
fore, not an acceptable measure of religious involvement per se. Another 
confusing problem with these classifications is that phenomena at diffe-
rent levels of abstraction are included. We also have the positions of 
typologies within typologies. 
Hunt (1972) broke away from this old simplistic and literal approach to 
measure religious involvement. The new approach was heralded by Greeley 
(1972) as a "decisive turning point in religious research" (p. 287). 
Hunt's new approach discards, as he terms it, the literal - fundamentalistic 
bias built into most of the paper-and-pencil measures of religiosity. A 
series of doctrinal statements are used in these scales, with the assump-
tion that those who disagree with these statements, lack religious involve-
ment. Hunt is concerned with the multiplicity of meanings which the 
respondent can attach to the same inventory item. RUmke (1952) spoke of 
"the shapes behind the words~, meaning that religious language can have 
many different "shapes" for different people. Religious language can be 
used empirically, tautologically, emotively, ceremonially, prescriptively, 
mythically, paradoxically and metaphysically. Each is presumably related 
differently to behavioural experiences of religion. Therefore, Hunt pro-
posed a literal-sy'mbolic (or mythological) dimension involving usage of 












Hunt (1972) proposed three orientations. The first is the literal (L) 
interpretation of religion, where an individual will tend to accept 
"at f'ace value''' any religious statement without in any way questioning 
it. This literal position may reflect an individual who has not exami-
ned the relation of his religious statements to other cognitive, cona-
tive, and affective areas of his life" (p.43). Secondly, an individual 
may, on the basis of a literal, naive, unexamined interpretation of reli-
gion, reject all religion as being of no value to him or the world. 
"This anti-literal (A) person may be rebelling against limited childhood 
religious teaching and restrictive teachers (including parents) in a 
manner similar to the adolescent rejection of parental authority as one 
aspect of his search for his own identity" (p. 43). The third possibility 
is a reinterpretation of religious statements, to seek the deeper !!I,l!-
bolic (mythological, M) meanings which lie beyond the literal wording. 
"This person's religious framework is more complex and capable of assi-
milating both the intention of religious orthodoxy and the realities 
of the contemporary world" (p. 43). 
From the above, it is clear that Hunt expects each interpreter L, A and 
M to differ in various ways. He predicts that their cognitive styles 
will be different. Rokeach (1960) is of the opinion that there is a 
degree to which a person can "receive, evaluate, and act on relevant 
information received from the outside on its own intrinsic merits, un-
encumbered by irrelevant factors in the situation arising from within 
the person or from the outside world" (p. 57). He terms the two extremes 
as closed and open cognitive styles. According to Hunt's notion, one 
would expect the literal and anti-literal interpreter to use a closed 
cognitive style and the mythological interpreter an open style. It is, 
therefore, expected that the literal interpreter will tend to have a 












religious beliefs, than the mythological interpreter. 
This could lead to other personality factors, such as being restricted 
or outgoing, assertive or inhibited (Becker, 1964). One could expect 
the L interpreter to be more inhibited, dependent and less creative, 
whereas the M interpreter is expected to be more outgoing, assertive, 
and creative. Brown (1962a) is of the opinion that strong social support 
is required for the maintenance of a system of religious belief. If 
this is so, it is valid to argue that the literal interpreter, who is 
more dependent, inhibited, etc., will strive harder than the M interpre-
ter to attain this social support. To attain this, he might be more in-
volved in church and religious activities, such as financial support, 
talking and reading about religion, church attendance, etc. 
The following hypothesis were then formulated. 
Hypotheeis I 
Subjects with a high "Literal Involvement" (LI) will differ significantly 
at the oe 0,05 level from subjects with a high "Mythological Involvement" 
(MI) on the following dimen~ions: 
(i) "Intensity of Belief" will be held with a higher intensity by 
LI subjects than MI subjects, as LI will tend to accept the statements 
at face value; 
(ii) LI subjects will be more dogmatic than MI subjects, as LI sub-
jects tend to operate with a more closed cognitive system than the MI 
subjects; 
(iii) On the personality factors of the 16 PF, the LI subjects will 
differ from the MI subjects, as LI subjects tend to be more threatened 












(iv) the LI will be more involved in religious activities than the MI 
subjects, as the LI subjects tend to conform more to the religious esta-
blishment, in participating more in institutional activities. 
Hypothesis II 
Subjects with a high "Literal Involvement" (LI) will differ significantly 
at the oC = 0,05 level from subjects with a high "Antiliteral Involvement" 
(AI) on the·.·following dimensions: 
(i) "Intensity of Belief" will be held with a high intensity by LI 
subjects and a low intensity by AI subjects, meaning that the LI subjects 
accept and the AI reject the statements with the same degree of convic-
tion; 
(ii) LI subjects and AI subjects will not differ significantly on 
dogmatism, as both groups operate with a closed cognitive system (being 
dogmatic); 
(iii) On the personality factors of the 16 PF, the LI subjects and AI 
subjects will deviate to the same degree from the mean. Both groups 
tend to :feel threatened by the "others" because of the rigid way in 
which their beliefs are heldo 
{iv) Subjects with a "Literal Involvement" (LI) will differ signifi-
cantly from subjects with an "Anti-literal Involvement" (AI) on religious 
activities, as LI will be involved and AI will not be involved in such 
activities. 
Hypothesis III 
Subjects with a high "Anti-literal Involvement" (AI) will differ signi-













ment" (MI) on the following dimensions: 
(i) AI subjects will reject with a higher degree statements on "In-
tensity of Belief" than MI subjects, as AI subjects will tend to reject 
the statements at face value; 
(ii) AI subjects will be more dogmatic th~n MI subjects, as AI sub-
jects tend to operate within a closed cognitive system; 
(iii) On the personality factors of the 16 PF, the AI subjects will 
differ from the MI subjects, as AI subjects tend to be more threatened 
by the "others" because of the rigid way in which their beliefs are 
held; 
(iv) The AI subjects will be less involved in religious activities than 
the MI subjects, as the AI will be involved in other non-religious acti-
vities. 
2 METHODS 
The strategy of the present study was to administer Hunt's (1972) LAM 
Scales to university students and. identify three relatively homogeneous 
religious involvement groups. These three groups would also complete 
other measures to determine if there were any significant differences 
between them. 
2.1. Subjects 
Three groups of students were approached in 1975 to complete the ques-
tionnaire. The Young Men's Christian Association, the 1st and 2nd year 
students following the courses in Religious Studies I and II, and the 
1st year Psychology class, were approached. From these groups 426 sub-













remaining 339 subjects, the 70 highest scorers on L (literal), A (anti-
li teral) and M (Mythological) were selected, making a total N of 2100 
The groups were equated for age and sex. The mean age of the total 
sample was 19,77 years. 
2.2. Scales 
The following scales were selected to determine differences between the 
three groups~ 
(i) Background variables: 
These ten items were selected in the following manner. Six items were 
selected from Allport, Gillespie and Young's (1948) "Aspect of Religious 
Belief Questionnaire", mainly to measure factors which influenced the 
subjects religious life. Another three self-rating questions were added, 
where the subject had to indicate the extent to which he considered him-
self, hie mother, and his father to be religious. In the last item the 
subject had to select from four statements, which statement most nearly 
described his religious awakening experienceo 
(ii) Runt's (1972) LAM scale 
This 17 item scale measures a literal, anti-literal or mythological re-
ligious involvement. For each of the 17 LAM items, three alternative 
statements were developed, each representing a literal, anti-literal or 
mythological interpretation of the item stern. 
(iii) Intensity of Belief Scale 
The Thouless (1935) questionnaire was used to measure different areas of 
belief. These areas were defined as belief in (i) Christ, (4 items); 













(iv) general religious beliefs (8 items); (v) opinion (6 items); 
(vi) fact (12 items) and (vii) miscellaneous (6 items). 
The wording of two of the items were changed to make them applicable 
locally. 
(iv) Dogmatism 
Rokeach's (1960) Dogmatism scale form E (40 items) was ueed. The main 
purpose of the Dogmatism scale is to measure individual differences in 
open and closed belief systems. By virtue of the way open and closed 
are defined, this scale also purports to measure general authoritarianism. 
(v) 16 PF 
The 16 personality factor questionnaire of Cattell et al. (1970) was 
used to determine personality differences between the three (L, A and 
M) groups. Form A, with 187 items, was selected as it is recommended by 
the authors for research work with university students. All sixteen pri-
mary factors were scored, as well as the first four secondary factors, 
and the Tabular Supplement (1970) was used to convert the raw scores in-
to stens making use of the different norms for different age and sex. 
(vi) Scales for basic religious dimensions 
To measure religious activity, six of the 11 scales proposed by King and 
Hunt (1967, 1969, 1972a, 1972b, 1975) in the Scales for Basic Religious 
Dimensions, were selectedo The following was decided upon: 
(i) Devotionalism (5 items); 
(ii) Church Attendance (3 items); 
(iii) Organizational Activities (6 items); 
(iv) Financial Support (5 items); 













each having four alternative answers, that measured how frequently a 
person was involved in religious activities during a specified time 
period. 
2.3 Procedure 
The abovementioned scales were assimilated into one questionnaire, which 
could be completed within one and a half hourso As information sheet 
was also included to give relevant demographic information such as age, 
sex, marital status and language. 
Students were asked to complete voluntarily a questionnaire in their free 
time. They could hand it back to any campus secretary for "internal 
mail". The experimenter received them back through the internal mail 
system. 
A total of 426 questionnaires were received back, of which 339 were 
scoreable. 
2.4 Analyses 
A mean and S.D. were calculated for each variable for the whole sample 
as well as for each separable group (L, A and M). A one-way analysis 
of variance was performed on each variable to establish the significance 
of the differences between the mean scores of the L, A, and M groups. 
Where the F ratio was significant, Tukey H.S.D. pairwise comparisons 
were conducted to establish exactly which groups differed (Tukey, 1968). 
3 RESULTS 
3.1. The LAM scales 
Three. relatively homogeneous groups were established through their total 
scores indicating their orientations as being literal (L), anti-literal 












The Land A scales correlated - 0,69 (significant at the O,Ol level), 
which is consistent with Hunt's (1972) and Poythres's (1975) findings, 
The L and M scales had an expected low negative correla.tion of - 0,25 
(p< 0,01), which is also in accordance with Hunt (1972) and Poythress 
(1975)0 A negative correlation of - 0,53 (p<: 0,01) was found between 
A and M ecaleso Both Hunt (1972) and Poythress (1975) reported a nega-
tive but uncorrelated A and M correlation. 
There was no significant correlation between sex and age on any of the 
LAM scales. 
3o2 · Background variabl~s 
The literal group (L) reported that their inner religious awakening was 
a definite awakening; they rated themselves to be "very religious"; that 
their own standing was firmer than their pgrents and their friends; that 
religion played an important part in their upbringing; that the following 
factors influenced their religious life: mother, conformity with tradi-
tion, gratitude, church teachings, aesthetic appeal, university and/or 
school groups, religious camps, friends of own age, and "other" influences. 
They also reported to feel embarrassed or isolated because of their reli-
gious views. 
Group A (anti-literal) reported no experiences of a inner religious awa-
kening; they rated themselves to be "not very religious"; that their own 
religious standing was less firm than their parents·and their friends; 
that religion did not play an important part in their upbringing and 
that none of the influencing factors played a important part in their 
religious standingo 
Group M (mythological) again reported that their inner religious awake-
ning was a more gradual awakening and they rated themselves to be "mode-












as their parents but firmer than their friends; that religion played an 
important part in their upbringing; that they were influenced in their 
religious lives by the following factors: mother, conformity with tra-
dition, gratitude, church teachings, university and/or school groups, 
aesthetic appeal, religious camps, friends of own age and "other" in-
fluences. 
3.3 Intensity of Belief Scale 
On the four religious belief scales (Christ, God, Orthodox Belief and 
General Religious Belief), there was a significant difference (p< 0,01) 
between the means of groups L, A, and M. Group L accepted these religious 
statements with a high degree of conviction; group M with a lesser degree 
and group A actually rejected these statements. 
No significant difference could be seen between the three groups on the 
Fact scale. On the Opinion scale only the means between groups L and 
A differed significantly. Gr up A accepted these statements with a 
higher degree of conviction. 
The means of groups L and A, and groups L and M differed significantly 
on the Miscellaneous scale. Group L accepted the statements with a les-
ser degree of conviction than groups A and Mo 
The findings of Thouless (1935) and Brown (1962a) that "the tendency to 
certainty" is less strong amongst non-religious beliefs than amongst those 
of religious order, is also supported by this study. 
3.4 Dogmatism 
The means of the three groups L, A, and M differed significantly. Group · 
L has the most closed cognitive system, then group M with group A having 
the least closed system. Their means being 143,68 for L; 168,01 for M 












There were significant differences between the groups on six of the pri-
mary factors (E, F, G, L, M and Q1) and on two of the secondary factors 
(QII and QIV) 0 
L vs A: 
· They differed on factors E, G, L, M, Q1 and Qiv• On all these, except 
for G, group L scored significantly lower than group A. 
L vs M: 
They differed on factors E, F, G, Q1, QII and Qtv• On all these factors, 
except for G, group L had significantly lower scores. 
A vs M: 
The difference between means reached a significant level, only on factor 
QIV where group A scored lower than group Mo 
3.6 Behavioral Scales 
On all six scales, Devotionalism, Church Attendance, Organizational Ac-
tivities, Financial Support, Talking and Reading about Religion and Growth 
and Striving, the means reached a statistically significant difference. 
Group L was the most active group, with group M coming second and group 
A being the least active in religious matters. 
4 DISCUSSION 
. 4.1 Background variables 
Group L (literal) rated themselves to be very religious, with more ·depth 
than their parents and friends. They have been strongly influenced by 












They also reported to have had a definite religious awakening experience, 
and that they sometimes felt selfconscious because of their religious 
views. 
Group A (anti-literal) tended to score in the opposite direction to 
group L. They mainly form an areligious group. 
Group M (Mythological) tended to score mid-way between groups L and A, 
but slanted over in the direction of group A on some variables. Their 
religious awakening was a more gradual process and thus they rated them-
selves to be moderately religious. Factors influencing their religious 
views were slight and they do not feel selfconscious of their religious 
views. 
4.2 Hypothesis I (L vs M) (i) Intensity of Belief Scale 
The findings supported the hypothesis on the four religious belief scales, 
and also the Miscellaneous scale, but in the opposite direction. On the 
other two non-religious scales, Opinion and Fact, the findings did not 
support the hypothesise 
Hypothesis I (L vs M) (ii) Dogmatism Scale 
This hypothesis is supported by this study in that group L was more dog-
matic (and authoritarian) than group M. 
Hypothesis I (L vs M) (iii) 16 PF 
The hypothesis of a significant difference between the means of group L 
and M was supported on the factors E, F, G, Q1, QII and QIV' but not on 
the 14 remaining factors. Compared to group M, group L seemed to be a 
more submissive, less assertive, less creative group with a stronger 












group with less super-ego-strength. 
H;ypothesis I (L vs M) (iv) Scales for Basic Religious Dimensions 
The hypothesis is supported by this study on all six scales. Group L 
was a more active group in their prayer life and more concerned with 
their relationship with God. They attended church more frequently, were 
more involved .in organizational activities, they supported the church 
better, financially,they showed more openness for growth and change in 
their religious beliefs and they were also more active in reading and 
talking about religion than group M. 
Hypothesis II (L vs A) (i) Intensity of Belief Scale 
The hypothesis of a significant difference between the means of groups 
L and A, is supported by this study on all seven scales. However, the 
directione for the religious and non-religious beliefs are reversed, in 
that group L accepted the religious beliefs with a higher degree of con-
viction, whereas group A again accepted the non-religious beliefs with 
more certainty than group L. 
Hypothesis II (L vs A) (ii) Dogmatism Scale 
This hypothesis is not supported by this study, in that there was a:.eig-
nificant difference between the means of groups L and A, group A being 
less dogmatic (and less authoritarian) than group L. 
Hypothesis II (L vs A) (iii) 16 PF 
On 14 of the factors the hypothesis of no significant difference was 
supported by this study. On the other six factors, E, G, L, M, Q1 and 
QIV' the differences reached a statistically significant level. Group A 












and jealous, more imaginative, more radical and more independent than 
group L. In comparison to group A, group L appeared to be more submis-
sive, higher super-ego-strength, more trusting, less imaginative, more 
conservative and more subdued. 
Hypothesis II (L vs A) (iv) Scales for Basic Religious Dimensions 
On all six scales a significant difference was reached by this study. 
Qroup A, being basically an areligious group, naturally participated 
less in religious activities than group L. 
Hypothesis III (A vs M) (i) Intensity of Belief See.le 
This hypothesis is supported by this study for the four religious belief 
scales, but not for the three non-religious belief scales. 
Hypothesis III (A vs M) (ii) Dogmatism Scale 
The findings supported this hypothesis.Group M was more dogmatic (and 
authoritarian) than group A. 
Hypothesis III (A vs M) (iii) 16 PF 
Only on one of the 20 factors, namely QIV' could a statistically signi-
ficant difference be reached between the means of groups A and M. Group 
A was more independent than group M. 
Hypothesis III (A vs M) (iv) Scales for Basic Religious Dimensions 
On all 6 scales the hypothesis was supported by this study. Group A, 
being an areligious group, naturally participated less in religious ac-












4•3o FURTHER RESEARCH 
(i) The LAM scales should make room for a hermeneutic dimension. 
(ii) The scoring procedure of the LAM scale should be changed to a 
Likert formato 
(iii) The relationship between upbringing and religious involvement 
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There have been numerous attempts, in recent years, to differentiate 
various dimensions representing unique religious orientations (involve-
ment) in religious research. Research has been greatly hampered by in-
adequate definitions and o1assificationso I will examine the defini-
tions and classifications which have been put forward by other resear-
chers, and then attempt to summarize these findings. 
1.1 Definitions and classifications 
l.l.l Problems of definitions 
The scientific study of religion has been criticized by Van den Berg 
• 
(1958) and others, for an "exclusion de la transcendance". By this 
oritisism, it is meant that God himself is excluded from the scientific 
study, which brings us to the theological problem of God immanent and 
God transcendent. 
Barth (1967) sees this problem in the light of God, the "Gans Andere" 
(transcendent), but who, in His free will, relates (immanent) to his 
creation. He states: "If, then, the freedom of G.od is understood pri-
marily as His own positive freedom, it can and must be understood secon-
darily as his relationship to that which is other than Himself, ••• as 
His true immanence as well as His true transcendence" (1967: P• 301). 
The role of the relationship between God and creation in itself is there-
fore, of vital importanceo Faith, in this sense, means to be in relation-
ship with God, and not just to believe that there is a God. Faith is, 
therefore, a response to God's effort of forming a relationship with 
man. ·we cannot only speak of man's relationship and exclude God from 
this relationship. A relationship needs a partner. This is perhaps 












when he states that this dimension "emphasizes the Deity's loving pre-
sence and guidance" (p. 177). Davidson (1972) termed in "vertical belief", 
by which is meant the "other-wordly" beliefs which define the nature of 
the supernatural order or emphasizes man's perso~al relationships to that 
order without .reference to the soc;lal ordero The "horizontal belief" 
concept, as used by Davidson, refers to "this-wordly" beliefs which 
emphasize man's relationship to other men. 
Van den Berg (1958) points out that'his is where the scientific study 
of religion falls short. He argues that only the one side (immanent) is 
studied and the other (transcendent) completely ignored, Grossman (1975), 
for exrunple, defines religion as a system of "mental and psychological de-
vices, which help men overcome, obviate, or counteract fear and anxiety, 
and the subjective and phsiological effects thereof" (p. 290). In this 
definition the "Gans Andere" is completely absent -- there is no Partnero 
In .his "Varieties of Religious Experience", James (1907 drew our atten-
tion to this deficiency. He says: "At the outset we are struck by one 
• 
great partition which divides the religious field. On the one side of 
it lies institutional, on the other personal religion. As M.T. Saba.tier 
says: One branch of religion keeps the divinity, another keeps man most 
in view" (pe 48). He also stresses the point of relationship in his 
definition. "Religion, ••• ~. shall mean for us the feelings, a.cts, and 
experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend 
themselves to stand in relation (my emphasis) to whatever they may con-
sider the divine" (po 50). The "relationship" and the "divine" cannot 
simply be ignored in the study of religion. On the other hand, how can 
this part (transcendenc~) be measured? Can the gods be measured by our 
scales? Are they available for scientific research? 













gods are not eniirically available, and neither their nature nor their 
existence can be verified through th~ ve-r, limited procedures given to 
the scientist. What is available to hi~ is a complex of human experience 
••••" (p. 125). The problems is that these human experiences cannot 
simply be equated to religious experiences. Becker (1971), in his analy-
sis of religion and psychological health, also states that there is an 
"otherness", a trans-empirical dimension about a religious faith that 
finds no place in psychological parlance. 
I feel, as Berger (1974), that this is a limitation that we will have to 
accept. To quote Berger againf "The gods, which appear in the religious 
consciousness as possessing an ontological status transcending this con-
sciousnees, are not available to the scientist in this alleged statue 
they are only available qua contents of human consciousness, thus as 
immanent by necessity" (p. 126) This limitation is accepted here. 
At this point, we must ask, "What is religion?" Theologians, sociologists, 
psychologists, psychiatrists and laymen have all put forward their own 
definitions. These definitions have all been criticised, and have either 
been rejected or accepted. I do not believe that it is the task of a 
psychologist to define what religion is. It is primarily the task of a 
theologian to define religion for us. The psychologist should define 
what he intends to investigate. 
As psychologist, I intend to investigate man's religious experiences -
how he experiences hie relationship with the "Gans Andere". This, then, 
means studying hie religious. beliefs, his religious attitudes (interests) 
and his religious behaviour (activity). This could be done by studying 
the individual's experiences and/or the religious experiences of a group 
as a whole. 
I prefer to speak, as Himmelfarb (1975), of religious involvement as 












beliefs, or activities" (p. 607). The implication of such a statement 
is that measures of religious involvement should not include variables 
in other domains of attitude or conduct that are thought to be a conse-
quence of religious involvement. Hunt and King (1972), for example, 
include an extrinsic dimension which, according to them, measures "an 
instrumental selfish attitude toward religion" (po 246). This is actually 
measuring the motivation behind religious involvement rather than involve-
ment per se. 
I decided, therefore, to use the term religious involvement to the more 
commonly used term religious commitment. In the literature on Christia-
nity, the term commitment is generally used, and on Judaism the term 
Jewish identity is used. Both of these terms are meaningful and imply 
a certain degree of involvement on two opposite ends of a scale. 
Religious involvement can range from minimally identifying as a religio-
nist. to being a committed religionist. The term involvement seems to 
be more neutral than commitment or identification as it implies less about 
degree. On the other hand, all three terms are trying to define the 
same phenomenon. The differences between studies, it seems, are not so 
much products of basically different phenomena being measured, but rather 
products of different conceptions of the components of the same phenomenon. 
1.1.2 Problems of classifications 
Many classifications have peen put forward, for example, by Fromm (1941), 
who spoke of authoritarianism and humanistic orientations; 
Adorno et al. (1950) distinguished between a religion which is conventio-












Broen (1957) reported evidence for a fundamentalism-humanitarianism 
factor and "nearness to God" as a separate, uncorrelated dimension; 
Allport (1950, 1954, 1966) argued for the "intrinsic" and "extrinsic" 
dimensions; 
Lenski (1961), in his careful study of religion in a Mid-West oity, 
differentiated between a conventional and a devotional orientation to 
religion; 
Glock (1962) and later Glock and Stark (1965), suggested that there are 
five "universal" dimensions. They are; ideological (belief); intellec-
tual (knowledge or cognitive); ritualistic (overt behaviour traditionally 
defined as religious); experiential (experiences defined as religious 
in the sense of arousing feelings or emotions); and consequential (the 
effects of the other four dimensions applied in the secular world); 
Allen and Spilka (1967) spoke of a committed religious orientation and 
a consensual religious orientation; 
Dittes (1971) spoke of an explicit, public and social dimension as to 
an internal, intrinsic, subjective, committed and spiritual dimension; 
King (1967) and later King and Hunt (1969, 1972a, 1972b, 1975) suggested 
the following eleven dimensionss creedal assent; devotionalism; church 
attendance; organizational activity; financial support; growth and stri-
ving; religious despair; salience behaviour and salience cognition; 
active regulars; intolerance of ambiguity; purpose in life: positive and 
negative; 
Himmelfarb (1975) delineates four main dimensions with nine subdimensionea 
(i) Supernaturals a. devotional, b. doctrinal and c. experimential; 
(ii) Communals a. affiliation, and b. ideological; (iii) Culturals 
a. intellectual-esthetio, and b. affectional; (iv) Interpersonals 
a. ethical. and b. moral. 
In all these typologies, there is a lack of clear focus on what is being 












1.1.2.1. The lack of mutual exclusiveness and exhaustiveness between 
categories 
The important studies by Allport (1950, 1954, 1966) and Allport and 
Rose (1967) revealed two typologies of religious involvement (or orien-
tation): intrinsic and extrinsic. These two terms quickly proved that 
they were not exhaustive enough and the ~uthors had to include another, 
namely indiscriminately proreligious orientation. Thompson (1974) re-
cognized a fourth dimension, indiscriminate antireligious orientation, 
after a careful analysis of Allport's typology. In the excellent study 
by Hunt and King (1971), on the intrinsic/extrinsic typology, it was 
clearly shown that these two categories were not mutually exclusive. The 
main problem was that it neither formed a conceptual nor a scoring con-
tinuum. This finding is supported in the studies of Feagin (1964), 
King (1967), Hood (1971), and Thompson (1974). 
King (1967) and later King and Hunt (1969, 1972a, 1972b, 1975) initially 
defined nine dimensions, but extended these to eleven •. This seems to 
be a more "exhaustive" approach, but the fact that they used the same 
variable for different dimensions brings the problem of exclusion to 
the fore. The correlations between these particul.ar scales manifest the 
problem, for example, Scale 2: Devotionalism, correlates + 0,72 with 
Scale 6: Growth and Striving (1975, p. 18). Such findings confounds 
the problem of typologies. Perhaps King and Hunt should rather search 
for main dimensions, which are mutually exclusive, with their own sub-
divisions. 
1.1. 2. 2. Temporally related phenomena .· 
We must use measures of phenomena that are occuring or have occured re-
cently as indications of present invoivement. Adult religious involve-
ment should not include events that happened in childhood, even though 












correlated with it. 
Glock and Stark· (1965) and the others who have followed their lead 
(Clayton: 1971; Faulkner and De Jong: 1966:;King and Hunt1·1972), err 
by using religious knowledge as a measure of religious involvement. 
Knowledge depends on many variables, particularly one's ability to retain 
information. The latter might have very little to do with one's desire 
or attempts to have such knowledge. A more p~oper measure of an intel-
lectqal dimension would be whether one studies about religion, rather 
than how much he knows. This could be the erowth and striving dimension 
measured by Hunt and King (1972). 
1.102.3. Levels of abstraction 
The debate about the number of dimensions of religious involvement 
(Cline and Richards: 1965; Dittes: 1969; Glock and Stark: 1965; King 
and Hunt: 1972, 1975; Brown: 1966; Wearing and Brown: 1972; Clayton and 
Gladden: 1974), with estimates running from one to eleven, stems to a 
large extent from the inclusion of phenomena at different levels of 
abstraction. 
Categories have been delineated by "careful" factor analysis, without 
the realization that some of the categories are subcategories of larger 
dimenaione, for instance the problem of "salience". King and Runt (1972) 
suggest that it is supposed to measure the importance of religion in a 
person's lifeo Isn't that exactly what the other dimensions try to do? 
Conceptually, salience is an overall measure of religious involvement . 
and not a type of involvement in itself (also see Roof and Perkins: 1975) 
The religious belief dimension can serve as another example of this pro-
blemo Most researchers will agree that doctrinal belief is one of the 
dimensions of religious involvement. However, researchers are now sug-











Thus, distinctions have been made between literal and symbolic interpre-
tations of the Bible (Hunti 1972) and thie-liorld ~· other-world belief 
orientations (Greeley: 1972). This would then suggest that we have four 
different dimensions. These types could rather be viewed as subdimen-
eions of a general dimension of doctrinal beliefs, rather than four sepa-
rate dimensions of religious involvement. 
I feel that the whole debate about the number of dimensione is unneoes~ 
sarily confusing, since all of the proposed dimensions are not at the . 
same level of abstraction. Some of the proposed dimensions are more ge-
neral, and some more specific categories of religious involvement. We 
have now arrived at the stage where we have typologies within typologies. 
With these research studies, note should be taken of the purpose of the 
study (e.g. is it a major variable in the study?), of the_particular 
population under investigation (e.g. are ali of the dimensions applicable 
to the population being studied?), and of their empirical utility (e.g. 
do the indications explain or predict?). We must, therefore, seek to 
identify the level of abstraction being considered, whether they are 
broad dimensions of involvement or subcategories of a particular dimension. 
T intend to use Hunt's (1972) three-dimensional approach for religious 
involvement in this etudyo The three orientations, Literal (L), Antili-
teral (A) and .Mythological (M), are broad categories which meet the above 
criteria. They will be used as independent variables which could be 
used for predictions. 
Gorsuch and Aleshire (1974) also argue that for research in the domain 
of psychology of religion the type and degree of involvement is of vital 
importance. This is possible with Hunt's scheme, because the type and 












The primary point of Hunt's (1972) article is that many of the paper-
and-pencil measures of religiosity used by previous researchers (e.g • 
.. 
Thurstone and Chaves 1929; Shaw and Wrights 1967) have a built-in bias 
toward a literal-fundamentalist interpretation of Protestant Christianity. 
Acknowledging that the literal-fundamentalist orientation is indeed a 
valid pro-religious orientation, Hunt argued that there are other orien-
tatione which a religious person might adopt which have been ignored by 
early investigators. This is typically true of measures with unidimen-
sion~l response formats (true/false; agree/disagree). The implications 
of this criticism for research are: (i) that many pro-religious (though 
non-fundamentalists) persons would be misclassified or inappropriately 
assigned to low-religious or non-religious groups because they disagree 
with the literal-fundamentalist biaf! built into the experimentor's measure 
of religiosity; and (ii) that findings from research utilizing such biased 
measures, significant group differences or correlations between religio-
sity and other variables, are "at best meaningless and at worst dangerous 
and misleading" (Hunt: 1972).
Hunt (1972), then, provides a scale to "describe a mythological-symbolic 
measure of religion which is independent of a literal-fundamentalistio 
measure of religion" (p. 43). He argues that the conservative-literal 
dimension should be distinguiaed from the literal-symbolic (or mythologi-
cal) dimension involving usage of religious language. Here literal-
symbolic is a language dimension assumed to be different from the coneer-
vative- literal continuum of religious doctrine. "Popular polarizations," 
Hunt states, "tend to equate 'conservative' with 'literal' and 'liberal' 
with 'symbolic'. However, it would be possible, for example, for a per-
eon to be quite 'liberal' in the sense of desiring social reforms yet 
be very 'literal' in permitting only one interpretation of a given 












Hunt's Literal (L) commitment is the one traditionally measured in reli-
gious research and represents the tendency to unquestioningly accept any 
religious statement at face value. "Thie position may .reflect an indivi-
dual who has not examined the relation of his religious statements to 
other cognitive and affective areas of his life (Hunts 1972, P• 43). 
The Anti-literal (A) commitment is basically an antireligious orientation 
in which a person rejects religion as being of no value to him or the 
worldo This person may be (i) rebelling against limited childhood reli-
gious teachers (including parents); or (ii) rejecting all Christian-
oriented interpretations of life. 
The Mythological (M) commit~ent is Hunt's new entry into the religiosity 
measurement schema and represents the tendency to reinterpret religious 
statements or doctrines and to seek the deeper symbolic meanings beyond 
their literal wordingo "The person's religious framework is more complex 
and capable of assimilating both the intention of religious orthodoxy and 
the realities of the contemporary world" (Hunts 1972, po 43). 
102 Ideational, behavioural and involvement 
Religious involvement, as set out above, does not operate in a vacuum 
but could be influenced by variables such as ideationaliem and behaviou-
rism. 
l.2ol Ideational 
Glock and Stark (1965) suggested that there are five categories of reli-
gious involvemento Only one of their dimensions -- the ideational ~ rela-
tes to religious beliefs as such. However, we also distinguished several 
subdimensions of religious ideology, and they have often been confused or 












ideology by means of single ad hoc questions (e.g. Allport, Gillespie 
and Youngs 1948; Thurstone and Chaves 1929; Vernons 1956; Brown and Lowes 
• ;~·· 9-
1951). The questions are usually ro'cussed on measuring the commitment 
to orthodox Christian dogma, but questions are often included on other 
.. 
aspects as well, especially the importance to the individual of his be-
liefs. Thus an atheist whose convictions were important to his self-con-
ception might receive a spuriously high score if the scaie were regarded 
as a measure of orthodoxy, and a spuriously low score if the scale was 
regarded as a measure of the subjective importanc~ of his belief. Corre-
lating scores on such scales to other characteristics are limited by the 
confusion in the scale itself. 
The relationship of an individual to any ideological system admits at 
least four dimensions or types of variation, as Putney and Middleton 
(1961) singled out. 
There is, firstly, the Orthodoxy dimension, which is a person's acceptance 
or rejection of the tenets of the system. Secondly, the fanaticism dimen-
sion, which is his orientation toward other persons with respect to his 
belief. Thirdly, we have the importance dimension, which is the signi-
ficance of his. beliefs to his self-conception. Lastly, the ambivalence 
dimension, whi.ch is the degree to which he recognizes ambivalence in 
his beliefs. 
Each of these dimensions could be largely independent of the others. 
I 
Someone who is highly orthodox might, or might not, be conscious of ambi-
valence. Someone who rated his beliefs very important to his self-concep-
tion would not necessarily be fanatic about spreading these beliefs to 
others. 
Although it was demonstrated by Putney and Middleton (1961) that these 












level, it was also clearly stated that their correlations with other 
variables such as socio-economic statue, year in college, etc., showed 
considerable variationo They come to the conclusion thats (i) the person 
.who is highly orthodox in religious beliefs tends to be•authoritarian, 
' ' .. 
highly concerned about his social statue, and conservative, is political 
and questioning and tends to be a female; (ii)the person who scores re-
l~tively high on fanaticism shows the same general charactietica as the 
highly orthodox individual, except that it does not correlate signifi-
cantly with sex; (iii) the person who rates his beliefs most important 
to his self-conceptions shares with the orthodox and fanatic the tendency 
to be authoritarian, concerned over social status, a~d conservative, and 
is more likely to be female than male; and {iv) those who not acknowledge 
feelings of ambivalence concerning whether or not they believe in reli-
gion are likely to be authoritarian, conservative and male (p. 289). 
It is clear from their study that religious ideology is neither a major 
determinant nor a simple resultant of personality characteristics, such 
as authoritarianism, conservatism or social factors such as place of 
residence, year in college or even church affiliation. 
Davidson (1972) demonstrated a further difference when he spoke of 
"vertical beliefs" (other-worldly beliefs which define the nature of the 
supernatural order) and "horizontal beliefs" (this-worldly beliefs which 
emphasize man's relationships with other men). He found that vertical 
beliefs were positively associated with personal concequences (social-
action orientations church members may derive from their religious be-
liefs). He then concludes that vertical beliefs have, and horizontal 













Another important factor which cannot be excluded from a study of ideo-
logy, is the degree, or as Thoulees (1935) termed it, the "tendency to 
;''..~:· :. 
certainty", with which a belief is held. Although Thouless pointed this 
out in 1935, very few studi-es have taken this int.o 'account. Thou1ess 
•• .. . . 
argued that people tend to accept or reject a certain belief with high 
intensity, while relatively few persons adopt the attitude of partial 
.. 
belief, that is, of regarding it as more or 'less probable. This third 
position he termed scepticism. He then defined the tendency-to-certainty 
law as followss "A belief .'tends to be held or rejected by an individual 
with a high degree of conviction" (p. 24). Thouless, as well as Brown 
(1962a), found a significant difference (p.<0,01) between the mean 
certainty of statements measuring "religious beliefs" and statements 
measuring "affectively indifferent non-religious beliefs". The tendency 
to certainty is less strong among non-religious statements than among 
those of a religious order. 
If the intensity-variable is taken into account, it is an oversimplifi-
cation to state that "belief" correlates with another variable. The 
direction, as well as the intensity, with which religious beliefs are 
held, must be taken into account. Rffmke (1959) notes that disbelief as 
well as belief can be held with the same outward signs of rigidity, nar-
rowmindedness and contempt for those who think differently, even down 
to fanaticism and persecutiono 
What, then, is the relationship between religious beliefs and the perso-
nality variable? A number of research studie~ have placed before us a 
generally negative picture of the person who professes religious beliefs. 
Brown and Lowe (1951) demonstrated that male Bible students scored higher 
on the hysteria scale than male non-believers. This means that the Bible 












of conventional physical symptoms. The same researchers, as well as 
Broen (1956), found that religiously oriented persons scored signifi-
cantly higher on the lie scale than non-believers. This suggests a 
stronger tendency among religious subjects to choose responses which 
would place them in the most favourable light sociallyo Brown and Lowe 
also found a negative correlation between the MF (Interest) scale and 
male Bible students, indicating that the non-believers had a basic 
interest pattern more like that of females than did the male Bible 
students. Religious belief has also been found to correlate positively 
with the California F-scale for authoritarianism (Frenkel-Brunswickr 1950; 
Gregorys 1957; Brown: 1962a; Photiadis and Johnsonr 1963; Weller et al.t 
1975), meaning either that religiosity leads to authoritarianism or 
authoritarian individuals are more attracted to orthodox doctrine. 
·These results were confirmed by some clinically oriented experiments 
wherein the religious person was shown to be more conforming and ego-
def ensi ve while the non-religious person was more independent (Dregera 
1952). In general, then, we receive a generally negative picture of the 
religious believer. He is a conventional, conforming person to whom 
being socially acceptable means a great deal. He is rigid, prejudiced, 
suspicious and generally pessimistic •. 
All this cannot just be accepted at face value, as other researchers 
pointed out. Brown (1962a) stated that the "strength of religious belief 
is associated with acceptance and membership of a church, while certainty 
about opinionative and factual matters is associated with personality 
variables and specifically with measures of anxiety" (p. 268). Stanley 
(1963), in a study of students from the Evangelical Union and the Student 
Christian Movement in Australia, found no relationship between fundamen-
talism and measures of neurosis, which supported Brown's general finding 












Rokeach (1960, P• 264) again reported that he found a correlation of 
0,36 to 0,44 between Dogmatism and Anxiety in various groups. Brown 
(1962a) concludes his findings by stating that "it is easier to be un-
certain about a factual matter which can be settled, than to be uncer-
tain about something which is literally a matter of belief; certainty 
about religious matters is possible because of the social support that 
can be evoked to sustain these beliefso Anxiety plays a role in holding 
matters of opinion strongly, but not in matters of belief" (po 269). 
This cognitive theory of religious behaviour is not the only variable, 
as Argyle (1958) pointed out. It can be extended to include affective 
components by drawing attention to the attachments to and arousal value 
of signs, symbols, objects and verbal formulations in any religious 
system. · In a further study of religious b lief in two Australian in-
terdenominational student societies, the Evangelical Union (U.E.) and 
the Student Christian Movement (s.c.M.), Brown (1962b) reported a signi-
ficant difference between central and peripheral belief, "central" being 
statements about Christ, God, etc., for instance, and "peripheral" being 
statements about theology, for example. This he attributed to the fact 
that words have an arousal value. Rumke (1952) stressed the same point 
when he spoke of the "shapes behind the words". Binkley (1962) and 
Hick (1962) have described eight ways in which religious laneuage can 
be used: empirical, tautological, emotive, ceremonial, prescriptive, 
mythical, paradoxical and metaphysical. Hunt (1972) also referred to 
the problem of religious language, and how the different types of 
"religious language" can be confused and confounded in most paper-and-
pencil measures of religiosity (e ~g·, Wilson: 1960; Feagin: 1964; Allportt 












In their extensive review on studies on prejudice, Gorsuch and Aleshire 
(1974) found that the traditional personality approach of most investi-
gators was difficult to interpret as it was not clear what influenced 
whato They state that speculations concerning.personality characteris-
tics as "causes" is not necessary; "the 'causes' are the environmental 
experiences which lead a person to commit himself to a noncenventional 
ideological position" (p. 289). Commitment helps the individual trans-
cend the cultural traditions and evaluate those traditions according to 
a consistent value standard. 
To summarize the abover it is important, when dealing with the ideatio-
nal dimension, that the following should be kept in mind: (i) there 
could be subdimensions; (ii) the intensity with which the belief is held, 
varies; and (iii) that it correlates with personality variables. There-
fore, when we want to examine the relationship between religious involve-
ment and the ideational dimension, the above points will have to be 
considered. 
2o2• Behavioural 
Under this heading we mean religious activity, for instance how frequently 
a person is involved in religious activities such as church and prayer 
meetings, choir, Sunday school, financial support etc., during a speci-
fied time periodo 
Most of the literature on Christians concentrate predominantly on idea-
tional measures, particularly orthodoxy (doctrinal beliefs). In fact, 
Clayton and Gladden (1973) argue that all other dimensions of religious 
involvement are simply components of the more· significant dimension, 












such as Himmelfarb (1975) and Cline and Richards (1965), have found that 
the more efficient measures of religious involvement are behavioural ra-
ther than ideational. Behavioural variables are efficient in the sense 
that they explain more of the variance in religious involvement and that 
more of the variance within them is explainableo According to this para-
digm in Himmelfarb's study, as well as in the study by Lazerwitz (1973), 
this is particularly true for American Jews. Until more comparative 
studies are available, we do not know if this holds true for Christian 
populations. Allport et alo (1948) reported that they found that fully 
half of the students who, in some sense, lead religious lives, do so 
without doctrinal convictionso Their explanation of this fact is that 
the adolescent has not yet found a mature structure of faith to support 
the religious experiences they have and the practices to which they hold. 
Cline and Richards' (1965) study of Mormons in Salt Lake also found the 
same implication in their male sampleo After performing a factor analy-
sis for each sex, using varimax solutions for the rotations, they found 
that the primary factor, Factor l, was Religious Behaviour, and "another 
somewhat distant and independent Factor X which we would title Religious 
Belief. What this means, apparently, is that with men, some can be very 
high in their religious activity yet at the same time come close to 
'failing' a belief test" (p. 575) 
I am not arguing that the one dimension is more important than the other, 
but am stressing the importance of the behavioural dimension. The one 
distinct advantage of the measure of the behavioural (activity) variable 
is that the criterion is a report of observable behaviour, as opposed to 
a religious belief or attitude. Another important advantage of this 
variable is that it provides a ready definition of religious involvement 












On the other hand, it can also have two disadvantages: (i) the meaning 
of involvement in church activities varies across denominations, Some 
groups have five or six events each week in which all members can partici-
pate, but others may have only one or. two.(ii) People who are religiou~ 
on a self-1rating scale may not be involved institutionally. Consequently, 
these people would be categorized as nonreligious, even though they view 
themselves as religious. 
It is, therefore, felt that a behavioural dimension is advantageous to 
a study like this one of religious involvement, and will therefore be 
included. 
* * * 
It is quite clear in evaluating the abovementioned research studies on 
religious involvement, that we have not gained much in our understanding 
of this area. There is still great confusion in the areas of definition 
and classification. On the other hand, these studies have not been in 
vain, but have pointed out some problems, some pitfalls and some areas 
in which to search for the answers. This study, then, wants to pursue 
a new direction, as propagated by Hunt (1972). 
Hie breakaway from the old simplistic and literal approach to measure 
religious involvement, will be my main focus. The old simplistic and 
literal approach was one of a literal-fundamentalistic interpretation 
of Protestant Christianity, in which measuring instruments are typically 
constructed with a eingle statement to which the subject must respond 
with true/false, agree/disagree, or other variations of these essentially 
unidimensional response formats. A simplistic bias is built into most 
of these measures, in that those who disagree with these doctrinal state-
ments are lacking in religious involvement (commitment). The main pro-













which the respondent can attach to the same doctrinal statement. Thie 
is what RUmke (1952) meant when he said that statements and words have 
different "shapes" behind them for different people. The word god could 
mean a swear word or the Creator of heaven and earth, all depending on 
what your "shape behind the word" ieo 
Therefore, Hunt's breakaway is to make use of the literal-symbolic dimen-
sion involving usage of religious language. Here "literal-symbolic" is 
a language dimension assumed to be different from the conservative-liberal 
continuum of religious doctrine. This will allow a person who become 
less literal and rigid in his religious perspectives, not to appear less 
religious, but to fall within a symbolic (mythological) religious orien-
tationo 
Hunt, therefore, constructed a Literal, Antiliteral and ~ythological 
(LAM) scale which enables us to distinguish between those with a literal 
and those with a mythological involvement. Under Literal we understand 
the person who accepts the doctrinal-statements at face value and has 
not examined the relationship of these statements to other areas of his 
life. Under the mythological orientations we understand the person who 
reinterprets these doctrinal statements to seek their deeper symbolic 
meanings which lie beyond their literal wording. 
The LAM scale, furthermore, complies to the'..requirements set out above 
for such a scale. Firstly, it excludes measures in other areas which 
might be a consequence of the orientation, e.g. activity (church atten-
dance). Another advantage is that they are not time-bound. The scale 
is not interested to find out what influences there were in early child-
hood, but is simply measuring a phenomenon (literal or symbolic) which 












of involvement can be measured. With this scale we can select people 
with a high degree of literal or symbolic orientation. Two groups can, 
therefore be selected with the same degree of involvement. This leads 
us to the fourth factor, that the two groups are mutually exclusiva~ making 
it possible to have two distinct groups who have the same degree of involve-
ment. 
The main question is, how will these two groups, literal and mythological, 
differ on various measurements? Do they differ, say, in ideational varia-
bles? Is there any difference between them or personality measures? How 
will they differ on behavioural (activity) scales? 
If Hunt's notion of a literal person, is accepted, we may conclude that 
such a .Person is using a closed cognitive system. One of the characteris-
tics of a closed cognitive system is to accept statements dogmatically. 
Rokeach (1960) found this to be so because of the threat (anxiety) caused 
by a disbelief system. An interpretation or a reinterpretation by the 
"other" causes anxiety. This then results in a closed cognitive system. 
When· the "other" does not hold a threat, an open system should result., 
Therefore, the person who is able to reinterpret the doctrinal statements 
in seeki~g their deeper symbolic meaning, will ~e,less threatened by the 
"other" and find it easily to develop an open cognitive style. 
If the person with a literal involvement uses a closed cognitive system, 
it is further postulated that such a person will tend to accept religious 
statements with a high degree of convictiono Thouless (1935) stated in 
his law of "tendency to certainty"; that a "belief tends to be held or 
rejected by an individual with a high degree of conviction" (p. 24). 
This finding was supported by Brown's (1962a) research. It can then be 
further argued that the person with an open cognitive system will accept 
these religious statements with a lesser degree of conviction as they 












The person with a literal commitment will then be inclined to be autho-
ritarian, taking up a position where his belief system is quite safe. 
On personality factors it is accepted that such a person will tend to 
deviate more from the norm than the person who is less threatened (e.g. 
a person with a mythological involvement)o 
Subjects with high literal commitments, with closed cognitive systems, 
who accept religious statements with a high degree of conviction, who 
feel threatened by the "other side", will tend to be more active in insti-
tutional matters, e.g. church attendanceo This is partly so bacause they 
funqtion within a closed cognitive system where it is the "right" thing 
to do. Brown (1962a) drew the attention to the fact that social support 
is required for the maintenance of a system of religious belief. Uot 
only social support is sought after, but also social acceptance. This 
can be gained by saying and doing the right things. Brown and Lowe (1951) 
. 
reported.that they found male Bible students to have a strong tendency 
to choose responses which would place them in the most favourable light 
socially, whereas the subject with the mythological involvement might 
not think it is necessary to partake in everything to gain social sup-
port and acceptance. When an appeal is made for active participation, 
he might not feel so threatened and therefore not participate. It is, 
therefore, postulated that such a person will be less active in religious 
matters. 
1.3 Hypotheses 
1.3.l Hypothesis I 
Subjects with a high "Literal Involvement" (LI) will differ significantly 
at thecc= 0,05 level from subjects with a high "Mythological" Involvement" 












(i) "Intensity of Belief" will be held with a higher intensity by 
LI subjects than MI subjects; as LI will tend to accept the 
'";· 
statements at face valuej 
(ii) 
. . 
LI subjects will be more dogmatic than MI subjects, as LI sub-
jects tend to operate with a more closed cognitive system than 
the MI subjects; 
(iii) On the personality factors of the 16 PF, the LI subjects will 
differ from the MI subjects, as LI subjects tend to be more 
threatened by the "Others" because of the rigid way in which 
their beliefs are held; 
(iv) the LI will be more involved in religious activities than the 
MI subjects, as the LI subjects tend to conform more to the re-
ligious establishment, in participating more in institutional 
activitieso 
1.3.2 Hypothesis II 
Subjects with a high "Literal Involvement" (LI) will differ significantly 
at theoe =t0,05 level from subjects with a high "Antili teral Involvement" 
(AI) on the following dimensions: 
(i) "Intensity of Belief" will be held with a high intensity by 
LI subjects and a low intensity by AI subjects, meaning that 
the LI subjects accept and the AI reject the statements with 
the same degree of conviction; 
(ii) LI subjects and AI subjects will not differ significantly on 
dogmatism, as both groups operate with a closed cognitive sys-












(iii) On the personality factors of the 16PF, the LI subjects and 
AI subjects will deviate to the same degree from the mean. 
Both groups tend to feel threatened by the "others", because of 
the rigid way in which their beliefs are heldf 
(iv) Subjects with a "Literal Involvement" (LI) will differ signi-
ficantly from subjects with an "Antiliteral Involvement" (AI) 
on religious activities, as LI will be involved and AI will not 
be involved in such activities. 
l.3o3 Hypothesis III 
Subjects with a high "Antiliteral Involvement" (AI) will differ signi-
ficantly(~= 0,05) from subjects with a high "Mythological Involvement" 
(MI) on the following dimensions: 
(i) AI subjects will reject with a higher degree statements on 
"Intensity of Belief" than MI subjects, as AI subjects will 
tend to reject the statements at face value; 
(ii) AI subjects will be more dogmatic than MI subjects, as AI 
subjects tend to operate within a closed cognitive system; 
(iii) On the personality factors of the 16 PF, the AI subjects will 
differ from the MI subjects, as AI subjects tend to be more 
threatened by the "others" because of the rigid way in which 
their beliefs are held; 
(iv) the AI subjects will be less involved in religious activities 














THE PRESENT 'STUDY 
The strategy of the present study was to administer the LAM scales of 
Hunt (1972) to a sample of students of the University of Cape Town, and 
to identify a number of relatively homogenous religious types based on 
their LAM scores. This would determine three separate groups, an L 
(Literal), an A (Anti-literal) and an M {Mythological) groupo Having 
identified these different religious groups with their specific involve-
ments, it was decided to compare these relatively distinct groups on a 
number of dependent measures popular in the religious research literature, 
to determine if these groups differ significantly on these variables. 
The main aim is, to determine the difference between the L and M groups. 
The L group, is the literal involvement group who tends to unquestioningly 
accept at face value a religious statement within their religious para-
digm without considering the symbolic interpretations. The M or symbo-
lic involvement group represents those with the tendency to reinterpret 
religious statements or doctrines and to seek deeper symbolic meanings 
which lie beyond literal wordingo 
The A, or anti-literal involvement group, will be compared to the Land 
M groups. As this is basically an anti-religious orientation in which a 
person rejects religion as bDing of no value to him or the world, and 
being negatively correlated to L and uncorrelated to M (Hunt s 1972; 
Poythress : 1975), it is expected that it will differ significantly from 













Three different groups were approached during the first term of 1975 to 
complete the questionnaire. The one group consisted of members of the 
Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) of the University of Cape Town. 
The second group consisted of 1st and 2nd year students following the 
courses in Religious Studies I and IIo The last group was the 1st year 
Psychology class. 
46 Subjects from the YMCA group responded. From the Religious Studies 
I and II group, 71 subjects returned their questionnaires, and 309 from 
the lat year Psychology class. This gives us a total of 426 subjects. 
From this total 87 questionnaires had to be discarded as they were incom-
plete, which left a total sample of 339 subjects. 
The 339 LAM (Literal, Anti-literal, Mythological) questionnaires were scored 
and grouped into high L, high A, and high M scorers. A fourth group then, · 
were those whose scores did not place them within any of these three (L4M) 
groups. 
The 70 highest scorers from each of the L,A and M groups were selected, 
thus giving three distinct groups with a total N of 210. 
The range of scores in each group was such that high scorers on L (Li-
teral) ranged from 13 to 17,high ~corers on A (Anti-literal) and M (My-
thological) ranged from 11 to 17. The mean score of each group could 
have been equalized by varying the cut-off points for each group. This 
would, however, have meant unequal numbers in the 3 groups and a lesser 
number of subjects in two of the groups (A and M)o As a larger sample 












in each group the same. This method in no way biases the probable out-
come in favour of any of the hypotheses. Indeed, it reduces the proba-
bility of obtaining significant results because of the lesser intensity 
of the scores in two of the categories (A and M). .This method was never-
.· 
theless decided upon because it was felt that it would yield more re-
liable results. 
TABLE I 
·Comparison of Age, Sex, Marital Status and Groups between L, A and M 
groups of the total sample (N=210) 
AGE SEX MARITAL GROUPS 
STATUS 
TOTAL 
18-19 20-25 Male Fe- Mar- Sin- YMCA Rel. Psycho 
male ried gle sto I & II 
L 32 38 34 36 2 68 28 14 28 70 
A 38 32 17 53 4 66 1 9 60 70 
M 45 25 24 46 6 64 3 17 50 70 
Total 115 95 75 135 12 198 32 40 138 210 
The N of 210 were all English-speaking students enrolled at the Univer-
sity of Cape Town for 1975. Of the 210 subjects, 75 were male and 135 
female (for a further breakdown of these figures, see Table .I), with 
no significant correlations between the sex of the subject and hie 
score on either of the L,A and M scales; thus the three groups are 
equated for sex. 
The mean age for the total sample was 19,77 years, with no significant 
differences between the means of the L,(mean 19,77; S.D. 1,73) A (mean 
19,83; S.D. 1,68), and M (mean 19,53; S.D. 1,76') groups. The groups are 












·2.2 Techniques of aseeeement 
The following instruments were used. 
1. Background varia'bles were obtained in selecting items from Allport, 
Gillespie and Young's (1948) Aspects of Religious Belief Question-
naire (ARB_9.). 
2. Hunt's (1972) ~ral, Antiliteral and Mythological Scale (LAM 
Scale). 
3. Thoulese' (1935) Intensity of Belief Scale. 
4. Rokeach'e (1960) Dogmatism Scale. 
5. .!.2El. by Cattel et al. (1970). 
6. King and Hunt's (1972b) Scales for Basic Religious Dimensions. 
Each scale will be briefly discussed to demonstrate its applicability 
for this study. 
Background variables 
These were items selected from Allport, Gillespie and Young's (1948) 
Aspects of Religious Belief Questionnaire (ARBO.). It originally consis-
ted of 18 questions, many of which had several parts. Following Hunt's 
(1968) procedure, the questions were renumbered to form independent 
questions, yielding one answer per question. Questions 4, 6, 8a, 9 













Each of the influences, listed as item 6 in the original ARBQ, wae lie-
ted independently with the alternatives of' "l= does not apply, 2= slightly, 
somewhat, and 3= strongly important"o In addition, "parental influence" 
was divided into "influence of mother" and "influence of father". The 
.. 
· i•personal .influence of people other than parents" wat1 divided into "in-
fluence of' other relatives" and "influence of friends of own age". Other 
possible influences not in the original instrument were listed as "uni-
versity/college/school groups", "religious camps", "crime" and "other 
influences"o 
In the first question the subject had to select from four statements 
which statement best described his "religious awakening" e:xperienceo 
The four items were mentioned lastly, and were selected from Stanley's 
(1964) questionnaireo 
This scale has 23 items which are reproduced in Appendix I. 
Hunt's LAM scale 
To measure religious involvement, the Literal, Anti-literal and Mytho-
·1ogical (LAM) scale, as introduced by Hunt (1972) was used. Only one 
other study (Poythresss 1975), using this scale, has been reported in 
11 teraturee After commenting on the LAM scale, Greeley .(1972) conclu-
ded that it "is clearly the best scale anyone has yet developed" (po 289). 
Greeley also predicted that Hunt's "break with the old simplistic and 
literal approach to measuring such attitudes ought to mark a decisive 
turning point in religious research" (p. 287). Until now, unfortunately, 
little of this prediction has become trueo 
This is a 17 item paper-and-pencil measure which was derived from the 












format. Three alternative statements, a Literal, an Anti-literal and a 
Mythological statement, were developed for each LAM item stem. Each 
alternative began with the word "agree" or "disagree", followed by a 
statement of the reason for the answer. 
A sample item from the scale follows: "I believe in the guidance of the 
Holy Spirit". 
- Agree, since God has said that he will be with us always; Prayer 
thus is an effective way of listening to God's guidance. (L~ 
- Disagree, since the supernatural, if it exists at all, is in no way 
directly involved in telling man what to doo (A.) 
- Agree, because this is one way of describing the involvement of God 
with his creation and man. (M.) 
An ipsative scoring procedure of 1-0-0 is used. Therefore, a total of 
17 points are to be distributed among the three scales. This scoring 
procedure was also followed in this studyo 
The reported scale homogeneity, after performing Gulliksen'e variance = 
covariance procedure, were 0,87 for the L scale, 0,92 for the A scale, 
and 0,77 for the M scale. 
Although Poythress (1975) used a modified version of the LAM scale by 
converting each statement into three Likert items, he found that the 
split-half reliabilities (corrected by Spearman-Brown formula) for L,A 
and M, were 0,94, 0,95 and 0,76 respectivelyo Thus, it can be accepted 
with confidence that these scales will distinguish three rather clear 
positions regarding religion. Hunt {1972) further reported that none 













The L (Literal) scale is to identify, according to Hunt, those who commit 
themselves "to a literal interpretation of religion in which he takes 
at face value any religious statament without in any way questioning it. 
This literal position may reflect an individual who has not examined 
the relation of his religious statements to other cognitive areas of his 
life" (Hunt: 1972, P• 43). 
The A (Anti-literal) scale identifies that person who, on the basis of 
a literal, naive, unexamined interpretation of religion, rejects all 
religion as being of no value to him or the world. Hunt (1972) suggested 
that the A scale probably measures the extent of negative reaction to a 
literal interpretation of religion, since it is negatively correlated 
with the L scale. This is also supported by the research of Poythress 
(1975) where he reported that Land A scales correlated - 0,88 {p<0.01), 
while the A and M scales were not related (r= 0,17 non-significant). 
The M {Mythological) scale identifies those who reinterpret religious 
statements to seek the deeper symbolic meanings beyond literal wording 
·"This person's religious framework is more complex and capable of assi-
milating both 'the intention of religious orthodoxy and the realities of 
the contemporary world" (Hunt: 1972, P• 43). 
One of the limitations of this scale is that it is obviously limited to 
the Christian framework for interpreting religion. Another difficulty 
lies in measuring the mythological involvemento By its very nature, 
the Mythological orientation is more subject to individual idiosyncracy 
than is either the Lor A orientation. As such, one who designs items 
to measure such an orientation, as Hunt has done, is likely to grasp 
only in part the particular symbolic interpretation which any given in-
dividual would consider appropriate for a given religious event or hap-
peningo This is what Rttmke (1952) meant when he spoke about "the shapes 












For futher discussion of this scale, see Chapter 4, p. 
is reproduced in Appendix II. 
Intensity of Belief Scale 
790 This scale 
The 40 items from Thouless' (1935) questionnaire were used to measure 
the degree of conviction with which a subject will accept or reject a be-
liet statement. In following Brown (1962a), another seven items were 
added. These 47 items we:r.e broken down to defined. areas, following Thou-
less' procedure in terms of item content. The areas were: belief in (i) 
Christ (4 items); (ii) God·(6 items); (iii) other orthodox Christia.n 
beliefs (5 items); (iv) general religious beliefs (8 items); (v) opinion 
(6 items); (vi) fact (12 items) and (vii) miscellaneous items (6 items). 
The following items were changed to make the scale more indigenouso Item 
33 was changed to "Piet Retief was killed by Dingaan's soldiers between 
1840 to 1850" instead of 11.rtiary Queen of Scots, was beheaded between 1580 
and 1590". In item 44 "India" was changed to "Rhodesia" so that the 
statement rea.d: "Rhodesia has, on the whole, benefited from British 
rule". Item 45 was changed from "The total national debt of Great Bri-
tain is more than a thousand million pounds" to "the total national debt 
of South Africa is more than ten thousand million Rand". These changes 
occur under areas Opinion and Fact. 
The scale is reproduced in Appendix III. 
In the study by Brown (1962a), 27 years after the study by Thouless (1935), 
he found the scale to be reliable as he could replicate the same mean 
certainty for religious statements as well as for non-religious state-












Brown reported a mean certainty for religious statements of 2,10 (Thou-
less 2,13) and for non-religious statements a mean certainty of 1,56 
(Thouless 1,575). Brown also did a retest after 8 months of 40 students. 
He reported the following test-retest correlations: Orthodox Beliefs 
0,85; General Religious Beliefs 0,92; Opinion 0,35; Fact 0,3; and Mis-
cellaneous 0,5. He feels ~hat the low reliability coefficients for the 
Opinion and Fact scales are probably spurious, as they may be due in 
part to the instability of beliefs about these questions, and to homo-
geneity in the scores. 
Brown, as well as Thouless, reported that there were no significant 
differences between sexes. 
The following scoring procedure was carried out. Each subject was asked 
tQ indicate to what extent he agreed or disagreed with a statement, on 
a scale of l (one) as "certainly true" to 7 as "certainly false". The 
sum total for each of the 7 scales would be the score for that particu-
lar scale. 
Dogmatism (D) 
Rokeach's (1960) Dogmatism scale form E was used, which consists of 40 
items on which the subject had to rate from 1 to 6 the extent to which 
he agreed (1 to 3) or disagreed (4 to 6). For scoring purposes a zero 
point was included, being 8 score of 4, so that the agree range was 1-3, 
and the disagree range then becomes 5-7. This is done to avoid subjects 
choosing an "uncertain" position. The total score, ranging from 40 to 
280, is the sum of scores obtained on all items in the test. For all 
statements, agreement is scored as "closed", and disagreement as ''open". 












Rokeach reported a corrected reliability (odd/even reliabilities, cor-
rected by Spearman-Brown formula) of 0;81 for the English Colleges II 
sample (N=80) and 0,78 for the English workers sample (N=60). In other 
samples, also reported by him (p. 90), the reliabilities ranged from 
0,68 to 0,93. Rokeach comments on this: "These reliabilities are con-
sidered to be quite satisfactory especially when we remember that the 
Dogmatism Scale contains quite a strange collection of items that cover 
a lot of territory and appaar on the surface to be correlated to each 
other. The fact that subjects agree or disagree with these items in 
a consistent manner is borne out by item analysis" (po 90). 
Quite a number of studies reported using this scale and finding it a 
valuable measure, e.g. Stanley (1963, 1964); Feather (1964); Wearing 
and Brown (1972); Raschke. (1973); Hoge and Carrol (1973); Thompson (1974) 
and Poythress (1975). 
The main purpose of the Dogmatism scale is to measure individual diffe-
rences in open and closed belief systems. By virtue of the way open 
and closed are defined, this scale also purports to measure general 
authoritarianism and intolerance. 
The person with the open cognitive style is concerned with the relation-
ships between his various beliefs and disbeliefs. Thus he can be ex-
pected to hold his religious beliefs in a manner that is relevant for 
the other aspects of his life; the contents of hie disbeliefs are likely 
to be abstract and related to one another, he is likely to differentiate 
between the relative importance of various beliefs and be willing to 
examine beliefs different from his own. The open cognitive.style is 
characterized by a high degree of differentiation among the relative 
values of beliefs one does not accept and thus it is not likely that 












the 'same degree of disapproval. Therefore, the open-minded person can 
be expected to be discerning concerning the meaning and implications of 
,. 
his religious beliefs as well as willing to examine sympathetically be-
liefs different from his own. 
The person with a closed cognitive system holds his various beliefs and 
disbeliefs separated and isolated from each other without concern for 
the relationships among them. He can be expected to hold on to the con-
tents of his religious beliefs in a concrete and literal manner without 
concern for contradictions within or between beliefs. He is likely to 
understand religinus beliefs in only one way and to make judgements of 
the rightness and wrongness of all ethical issues in an absolute manner, 
without distinguishing between the relative importance of such issues. 
Because the closed-minded pers9n holds his beliefs isolated from each 
other, he is likely to be more vague concerning the meanings, relation-
ships and implications of his beliefs. Since the closed-minded person 
rejects strongly and on an equal basis a.11 beliefs he does not hold, he 
has a high degree of differentiation between what he believes and disbe-
lieves; sees the world as basically threatening, and sees authority as 
absolute -- he is likely to be relatively inaccessible to religious 
ideas different from his own. 
A problem that can be encountered with the questionnaire is that acquies-
cence response set (yeasaying) and its opposite (naysaying) can strongly 
influence the scores. Acquiecence and negativistic responce sets refer 
to the tendency of some persons to respond to questionnaires with rather 
consistent styles regardless of item content -- tending either to agree 
with most statements or to disagree with most. Therefore, a highly ac-
quiscent person's responses would produce a low score (meaning an closed 
cognitive system according to the Dogmatism scale). When interpreting 













The scale is reproduced in Appendix IV. 
·.~ ... 
Cattell's 16 Personality Factor Questionnaire (16PF) Form A 
What is now well-known as the 16PF, is the most comprehensive test used 
in this studyo Consisting of 16 scales, the test covers the fundamental 
personality traits isolated by Cattell and his colleagues during thirty 
years of factor analytic research. Form A, one of a number (6) of pos-
sible alternatives to the test, consists of 187 items, each allowing 
three possible answers, e.g. "I somewhat dislike having a group watch 
me at worR:" -- (a) yes; (b) in between; and (c) no. The test may be 
administered both in group and individual situationso As indicated by 
Cattell, Eber and Tatsuoka (1970), the items are designed for ordinary 
newspapers-literate adults, and Form A and B are recommended for re-· 
search work with university and high school students. Form A was, there-
fore, thought to be appropriate for the present subjectso 
The reason for not using the South African Form A is that the manual 
detailing South African norms has not yet been published by the Human 
Sciences Research Council (personal communication)o Therefore, the 
American Form A and norms (Tabular Supplement, 1970) were used. 
The factors that Cattell measures with the 16PF are not fundamentally 
different from the underlying variables of other personality theorists. 
What is novel however, is the technique of factor analysis which was 
employed in arriving at these variables, Cattell mentioned 100 factors 
in his Universal Index of Source Traits (Cattell, 1957), which contains 
only those factors considered to be established with some degree of 
certainty. Of the 100, Cattell considered the 16 contained in the 16PF 
to be fundamental. However, even these factors are not completely inde-

















between the loadings of the different factors indicating that these so-
called factors are still due to more fundamental factors. Thus further 
factor analyses have revealed eight second order factors, although only 
a few are commonly used, and a number of tertiary factors, ~hilst fourth 
order factors must still be envisaged (Cattell et al: 1970). 
In this study the 16 primary factors as well as 4 secondary factors 
were used. 
Over the years an impressive body of reliability and validity data has 
been collected. Probably the most importAnt of several varieties of 
reliability coefficients, is the dependability coefficient which asses-
ses the degree of change between two administrations of the test when 
the time lapse is insufficient for the subjects themselves to alter. 
Table 2 shows test-retest reliability after one week with a group of 
18 year olds on Form A (Cattell et al: 1970, p. 30). 
TABLE 2 
Scale Reliabilities, Calculated as dependability Coefficients (Test~Retest 
4 to 7 days) 
SOURCE TRAITS 
Form A B C E F G H I L 
A* 81 58 78 80 79 81 83 77 75 
*American subjects: N=l46 
Note: Decimals have been omitted 
M N 
70 61 
0 ~l Q2 
79 71 71 
Q3 Q4 
62 81 
The somewhat lower reliability on particular scales is thought by the 
authors to reflect less on the factors themselves than on varying test 












The validity of the 16PF is in a real sense reflected in its development. 
The items included in the present 16PF a.re those that remain from several 
thousand originally tried, and they consist of those which continue to 
have significant validity against the factors after three successive 
factor analyses (Catell et al.: 1970). These analyses both supported 
and bore out the existence and structure of the 16 factors, and cross-
valida.ted the items against the factors on different populations. 
In spite of th~ sophistication of Cattell's research and the 16PF, the 
technique of factor analysis does have some logical limitations, an 
awareness of which is important. 
Firstly it· should be emphasized that the notion sometimes implied by 
factor theorists, that the specific factors discovered are in some sense 
"universally fundamental", is erroneous. In short, the definition of 
the factor is strongly dependent on the surface variables used in the 
investigation and a comparison of factors obtained from different varia-
bles, is difficult. Thus, Cattell derives different factors from data 
based on life histories and questionnaires (Land Q data) compared with 
that based on tests and experimentation (T data) (Hall and Lindzey, 1970). 
For the same reason Guilford (Hall and Lindzey, 1970), using other traits 
of behaviour, arrived at still different factors. In principle, then, 
factorial analysis should be based on "every trait of behaviour" in order 
to discover truly fundamental factorso As this is not possible, factorial 
analysis must to some degree be fragmentary. Possibly the recent debate 
between Cattell (1972) and Eysenck (1971) over the relative validity of 
the 16Pl!, and EPI is, in fact, partly a result of this precise limi ta ti on 
of factor analysis, as well as the utilization of subtly different factor 
analytic procedures by the respective scientists. 












analysts work is not wholly objective. This is so particularly if the 
factors consist of diverse elements. In this situation the psychologi-
cal meaning of the factor is by no means clear, and considerable effort 
is required in interpreting and understanding the factor. "These· inter-
pretations are the weak point of factorial analysis and each factor re-
quires numerous complementary studies before it can be clearly defined" 
(Meili, in Fraisse'and Piaget; 1968). This subjectivity involved in 
naming the factors is to a greater or lesser extent then, inevitable • 
• 
More specifically, an examination of clinical research with the 16PF 
suggests two major weaknesses which could under certain experimental 
circumstances prelude its reliable use. The first is that unlike many 
other personality questionnaires such as the MMPI and the Californian 
Psychological Inventory, the 16P~, has no built-in validity scales to 
assess lying, faking or some other motivational distortion. Although 
it must be admitted that these validity scales on the above-mentioned 
tests are still somewhat crude, they do help significantly to decide 
whether to reject a subject's answer sheet altogether or, more helpfully, 
to apply corrections. Although research at the present time is procee-
ding into this area (Meredith, 1968), Cattell recommends the use of the 
Objective-Analytic battery when distortion dangers are excessive (Cattell 
et al: 1970). 
The second specific weakness of the 16PF is its inability "to substan-
tiate the whole diagnosis of psychoticism" (Cattell et al; 1970, P• 269), 
and Cattell admits that until this aspect of the 16PF is considerably 
improved, the test will be unable to play its full role in psychiatric 
hospitals. 
It is thought however, that the above-mentioned limitations of the 16PF 












the present sample is selective to the extent that all psychotic sub-. 
jecte were excluded from the sample so that the 16PF's inadequacy in 
this respect does not apply. The distortion factor, however, is more 
complex and no easy solution is possible. However, it should be empha-
sized that the present experimental situation is not a "distortin~ 
situation" to the same extent as an occupational selection situation 
is; or even a clinical situation is, where "fake bad" or "fake good" 
response sets are common. 
This scale is reproduced in Appendix V. 
Behavioural 
To measure religious activity, several scales were selected from King 
and Hunt's Scales for Basic Religious Dimensions, as set out by them 
in a series of papers (1967, 1969, 1972 a and 1972 b, 1975). They at-
tempted to develop scales measuring different aspects of religious belief 
and practice related, directly or indirectly, to congregational and deno-
minational life. 
The data came from questionnaires containing a large number of diverse 
items. Factor analysis was used to look for sets of items which could 
be interpreted as different aspects of religious behaviour. The highest 
loading items in each factor were subjected to item-scale.analysis. This 
analysis greatly aided the judgement whether and which, items from a 
factor formed a cluster homogeneous enough to be potentially useful as · 
a scale. Scales were developed for the following basic dimensions: 
Creedal Assent, Devotionalism, Church Attendance, Organizational Activity, 
Financial Support, Religious Knowledge, Orientation to Growth and Striving, 
Extrinsic Orientation, Salience-Behaviour and Salience-Cognition (King 












For each scale, a coefficient of homogeneity (Cronbach's alpha), and 
for each separate i tern a correlation coefficient w.i th that scale, is 
·' 
provided. The coeffficient of homogeneity (CR) is reported for each 
scale below. This is the ratio of the covariance among items on a scale 
to the total scale variance, in relation to the number of items. It is 
called a "homogeneity" coe.fficient to emphasize interitem relationships 
as the basis for ~n estimate of internal consistency or reliability. 
As the coefficient approaches 1,0, the more each item measures what all 
the other items on the scale measures. As it approaches zero, the sepa-
rate items measure different characteristics. 
Two cautions should be noted. First, alpha reliabilities are not the 
same as test-retest correlations. Alpha is based on the same matrix 
(sample) from which the items for the scales were selected. Second, 
reliability is influenced by more than items, e.g. differences between 
samples of subjects and changes in subject behaviour over time. In 
the absence, then, of clear norms or binding conventions, it is assumed 
that coefficients of 0,75 and above, indicate enough homogeneity among 
items to d.iscuss them as a potential scale. The higher the coefficient, 
the better, since single-dimension scales are desired. 
In the original study the validity of a scale was judged in terms of its 
utility or explanatory power. Alternative forms of all possible scales 
were correlated with each other and with measures of independent varia-
bles. Examination of the intercorrelations led to elimination of some 
scales and to selection of one form of each scale. 












Devotionaliem (Coefficient of homogeneity (CH) • 0,852; 5 items). 
It is similar to Lenski's (1961) "devotiOnalism", less so to Glock's 
(1962) "experimential". The items deal with personal prayer life, with 
closeness to and communication with God, e.g., "I frequently feel very 
close to God in prayer, during public worship, or at important moments 
in my daily life" (strongly agree - strongly disagree)o 
Church Attendance (CH = 0,821; 3 items) 
These items related to frequency of church attendance and frequency of 
Communion; e.g. "How often have you taken Holy Communion during the 
last year?" (regularly; fairly regularly; occasionally; seldom/never). 
Organizational Activities .·(CH• O,e31; 6 items). 
These items relate to the frequency of articipation in, and the satis-
faction derived from, congregational activities, as well as a self-rating 
of congregational activity, e.g. "I enjoy working in the activities of 
the Church" (strongly agree - strongly disagree). 
Financial Support (CH = 0,734; 5 items). 
It contains items which report the amount and percentage of income con-
tributed to the Church and the regularity of giving, e.g., "I make finan-
cial contributions to Church": (in a regular planned amounts; irregularly 
but fairly often; irregularly and only occasionally; seldom or never). 
The last three scales, Church Attendance, Organizational Activity and 
Financial Support, represent the dimension which Glock (1962 termed 












Talking and Readingabout Reli_gion (CH= 0,825, 7 items). 
This dealt with the frequency of talking about religion with others in 
everyday life and frequency of reading the Bible and church publications, 
e.g., "How often-,~ .. ? •. you talk about religion with your friends, neigh-
bours, or fellow workers?" (regularly - seldom/never). 
Growth and Striving (CH= 0,806; 6 items) 
The item content suggest a combination of two Wesleyan descriptions of 
a Christian who is not stagntmt, but erowing in gracei "groaning after 
salvation" and "moving on toward perfection", e.g. "!try hard to grow 
in understanding of what it means to live as a child of God" (strongly 
agree - strongly disagree). 
A hieh scorer expresses diseattsfaction with his current religious state 
and a feeling of need to learn, change and grow. 
Four of the six items are also on other scales, therefore, interpreta-
tion in relation to these scales should be especially cautious. 
In all, these scales consist of 30 items which have four alternative 
answers. All items are answered on a four-point scale from "strongly 
agree" to "strongly disagree". The ''how often" items have "regulaly", 
"fairly frequently", "occasionally" and "seldom or never" as alternatives 
The scale is reproduced in full in Appendix VI. 
2o3 Procedure 
The six scales, as described above, were assimilated into one question-
naire. To complete this questionnaire, subjects required approximately 













relevant demographic material such 'as age, sex, marital status and 
language. 
The experimentor met the subjects in their various gr~~ps (e.g. Y.M.C.A.; 
'·· .. 
_Religious Studies I and II; etc.) and explained !he purpose of this re-
search study. Students who were interested were asked to complete volun-
tarily a questionnaire. They were also assured that all the information 
requested from them would remain anonymous. The subjects completed the 
questionnaires in their own time and handed. them back to any campus sec-
retary for "internal mail". The experimentor received them back through 
the internal mail system of the university. 
On receiving the questionnaires they were scored as described earlier. 
2.3.1 Statistical Analvses 
A mean and standard deviation were calculated for each variable, for the 
whole sample (N = 210) a.swell as for the Literal (L), Antiliteral(A) 
and Mythological(M) groups, separately. 
An one-way analysis of variance was performed on each variable to esta-
blish the significance of the differences between the mean scores of 
the L, A, and M groups. ~~ere the F ratio was significant, Tukey H.S.D. 
pairwise comparisons were conducted to establish exactly which groups 
differed: These procedures follow the guides laid down in Kirk (1968), 














3ol The LAM scales 
The first step in the data analysis was to cluster members of the pre-
sent sample into relatively homogeneous groups, based on their scores 
in the LAM scales. By inspecting the mean scores for each separate 
group as set out in Table 3.1., it is clear that we have three distinct 
groups. 
TABLE 3.1 
Mean scores for the three groups Literal, Antiliteral end Mythological 
on the three scales L, A and M, of the LAM scale. 
Groupe Mean 
L A M N 
Literal 15,13 ,33 l,86 70 
group 
Antiliteral 0,03 13,06 2,49 70 
group 
Mythologicai 1,84 3,61 12,66 70 
group 
The Literal (L) and Antiliteral (A) scales correlated - 0,69 (signifi-
cant at 0,01) which is consistent with Hunt's (1972) and Poythress' (1975) 
findings. It seems that Hunt's notion that the A scale probably. measures 
the extent o~ negative reaction to a literal interpretation of religion, 












The Literal (L) and Mythological (M) scales also had a low negative cor-
relation of - 0,25 (p<.0,01).. This weak relationship between Land M is 
to be expected in view of the fact that several of the Land M items 
differ only in rationale, not in direction of agreement, regarding the 
same religious concept. A low correlation between L and M was also re-
ported by Hunt (1972) and Poythress (1975) .. 
A negative correlation of - 0,53 (p<. 0,01) was found between the.A and M 
scales. Both Hunt (1972) and Poythress (1975) reported a negative but 
/ 
uncorrelated A and M correlation .. 
Hunt (1972) reported that none of the differences between sexes on any 
of the LAM scales were statistically significanto This finding is also 
supported by this study in that there was no significant correlation 
between sex and any of the LAM scaleso There was also no significant 
correlation between age and any of the LAM scales. 
3.2 Background variables 
The first item was the "conversion" statement, ~here the subject indi-
cated which form his inner religious awakening may have taken. A sig-
nificant difference (p~ 0,01) was found b~tween the L, A and M groups. 
(See Table 3.2). The Literal group reported a definite awakening more 
frequently; the Anti-literal group reported no awakening more frequently 
and the Mythological group reported a more gradual reli~ious awakening 
more frequently. 
The next question was a religious self-rating 5 point item. Again a 
significant/difference (p ~0,01) was found between the L, A and M groups .. 












literal group as "not very religious" and the Mythological group as "mode-
rately religious". 
In expressing their views of their parents' (items 3 and 4) religious 
standing, all three groups rated their fathers and mothers equally "re-
ligious". Comparing their own firmness (or depth) of their belief in 
religion to that of their parents, (items 7 and 8), the Literal group 
rated their own firmness more often as "more firm"; the Mythological 
group tended to rate themselves as "about the same" and the Antiliteral 
group rated themselves as "less firm". Comparing the. firmness (depth) 
of their belief in religion to other young people of their own age (item 
9), the L and M groups rated themselves as being "stronger", but the A 













Analysis of Variance of the 3 groups L, A, and M, on the 10 Background 
Variables, and Comparisons between Groups L and A, A and M, and L and M. 
L vs A A vs M L vs 
Items Fl p t2 p t p t 
1 Conversion 77,83 ,01 17,65 ,Ol 9,3 ,01 8,35 
2 Religious self-rating 160,2 ,01. 24,43 ,01 13,3 ,01 12,1 
3 Father's religion 2,35 NS NS NS 
4 Mother's religion 2,58 NS NS NS 
5 Influence: Mother 
'I 
4,·74 ,01 2,35 NS 4,35 ,Ol 2 
Father 2,71 NS NS NS 
Tradition 4,49 ,01 1,71 NS 2,31 NS 4,03 
Relatives 0,22 NS NS NS 
Gratitude 5,87 ,01 4,83 ,01 2,7 NS '· 2,05 
Studies 0,98 NS NS NS 
Church Teachings 33,82 ,01 11,52 ·. ,Ol 7,2 ,01 4,32 
Aesthetic 6,13 ,01 2,25 NS 5,03 ,Ol 2,78 




Camps 34,22 ,01 11,24 ,01 3,16 NS 8,08 
Friends of own age 25,63 ,01 10 ,01 2,98 NS 7,02 
Death 
I 
1,11 NS NS NS 
Crime 0,47 NS NS· NS 
Other 9,49 ,01 6,21 ,01 3,15 NS 3,05 
6 Religion in upbringing 12,37 ,Ol 6,32 ,01 6,04 ,01 0,28 
~ 
55,36 ,Ol 5,77 ,01 9,05 7 Firmness - Mother ,01 14,82 
8 Firmness - Father 68,5 ,Ol 16,54 ,Ol 8,41 .·~ ,01 8,13 
9 Firmness - Friends 70 ,01 16,64 ,Ol 8,9 ,01 7,75 
10 Embarrassed 14,7 ,Ol 7,03 ,Ol 0,86 NS 6,17 
1 df = 2 : 207 





































Religion as an influence in the subjects' upbringing (item 5), played a 
more significant role in groups L and M than in group A. (See table 3.2.) 
There were no significant differences between groups L and A, and L and M 
on mothers' influence, but it reached statistical significance between 
groups A and Mo 
There was no significant difference in the way fathers influenced group 
L• A and M. Group M seemed to be influenced more by "conformity with 
tradition" than group L, but not more than group A. Influence of other 
relatives was non-significant in all these groups. Gratitude was a stronger 
influence in group L than in A, but not stronger than in M, and "studies 
in school or college", "illness or death" and "crime" were non-significant 
influences in all these groups. 
"Church teachings" as well as the influence of university and/or school 
groups were significantly different in all three groups (p< 0,01). These 
influences were highest in group L, less in group M and least in group 
Ao The "aesthetic appeal" was the highest in group M, but not signifi-
cantly higher than group L, and significantly higher than group A. "Re-
ligious camps" and "influence of friends of own age" played a significant 
role in groups L and M, giving a significant difference (p.c:. 0,01) between 
groups L and A, and L and M but not between groups A and Mo The L group 
reported a significantly higher degree of "other infl\lences". 
To summarize the above: The L group reported that their inner religious 
awakening was a definite awakening; they rated themselves to be "very 
religious"; that their own standing was more firm than their parents and 
their friends; that religion played an important part in their upbringing; 
that they were influenced by mother, conformity with tradition, gratitude, 
church teachings (more than group M), aesthetic appeal, university and/ 












friends of own age (more than group M) and "other influences". 
The A group reported that they did not experience an inner religious 
awakening; they rated themselves to be not very religious; that their 
own religious standing was less firm than their parents, and their 
friends; that religion did not play an important part in their upbrin~ 
ging; that none of the influence factors played an important part in 
their religious standing. 
Group M reported that their inner religious awakening was a more gradual 
awakening and they rated themselves to be "moderately religious", that 
their religious standing was about the same as their parents but firmer 
than their friends; that religion played an important part in their up-
bringing; that they were influenced by mother, conformity with tradition 
(more so than group L), gratitude, church teachings, university and/or 
school groups, aesthetic appeal, relig~ous camps, friends of own age and 
"other influences". 
Group L also reported ( on item 10), that they more often feel embarrassed 
or isolated because of their religious views (significant at ,01 level). 
3.3 Intensity of Belief Scale 
On the four religious belief scales, Christ, God, Orthodox Belief and 
General Belief, there was a significant difference (P<0,01) between 
groups L, A and M (See table 3.3). Group L scored significantly lower 
(meaning a higher intensity) than groups A and M. Group M again scored 
significantly lower (meaning a higher intensity) than Group A, but sig-













Analysis of.variance of the 3 groups L, A and Mon the 7 Belief variables 
of the Intensity of Belief Scale, and comparisons between groups L and A, 
A and M, and L and M. 
L vs A A vs M L vs 
Measure Fl p t2 p t p t 
Christ 331,84 0,01 36,08 0,01 15,8 0,01 20,28 
God 370,08 0,01 38,19 0,01 23,44 0,01 14,75 
Orthodox Belief 181,48 0,01 26,84 0,01 11,58 0,01 15,26 
General Belief 583,23 0,01 46,83 0,01 13,09 0,01 33,73 
Opinion 3,23 0,05 3,59 0,05 1,58 NS 2,01 
.Fact 1,74 NS NS NS 
Miscellaneous 43,68 0,01 9,79 0,01 2,83 NS 12,62 
1 df = 2:207 
2 Refer to tables of the Studentized Range Statistic with df = 3:207 
On the non-religious scale "Opinion", the differences were significant 
(p<0,05) between groups Land A, but not between Land M, nor between 
A and M. Group A had a higher intensity than Group L. 
wer<-
The re ~ no significant differences between the three groups on the 










On the non-religious scale "Miscellaneous", the differences were signifi-
cant (p<. O ,01) between groups L and A, and groups L and M, but not so 
for groups A and M. On this measure group L scored a "low,er intensity" 












Both Thouless ~1935) and Brown (1962 a) reported that "the tendency to 
certainty" is less strong amongst non-religious : 1~statements: than amongst 
those of religious order. Thia finding is also supported in this study 1 
by the L group where the mean certainty for religious statements is much 
higher than the mean certainty for non-religious statements (A low score 
meaning a high intensity). This finding does not hold true for groups 
A and M. See table 3.4. 
TABLE 3.4 
Mean and S.D. for the three groups L, A and M for the Religious Belief 
and Non-religious Belief Scales of the Intensity of Belief Scale 
. 1 
Religious Belief Non-religious Belief 2 
Group MEAN S.D. MEAN S.D. 
L l,41 0,28 4,()4 0,35 
A 5,13 0,69 3,64 0,4 
M 3,54 0,76 3,65 0,5 
I 
l Scales = Christ; God; Orthodox Beliefs; General Beliefs. 
2 Scales = Opinion; F~ct; Miscellaneous. 
To summarize the above: Group L·scored a higher.intensity of belief on 
subscales Christ, God, Orthodox belief and General belief than groups A 
and M. On subscales "Opinion•• and "Miscellaneous", group A again scored 
a higher intensity than group L but not higher than group Mo Group :£17, 
again, scored a higher intensity than group A on all the subscales, 
except for "Opinion", "Fact" and "Miscellaneous", for which no signifi-











Mean scores for the three groups L2 A and M on the 7 scales of the 
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There is a significant difference between groups L and A, L and M and 
A and M. See table 3.5 
TABLE 3.5 
Dogmatism: Analysis of variance and comparisons between groups 
L and A, L and M1 and A and M 
L vs A L vs M A VS M 
Fl p 't 2 p t p t 
35,78 0,01 11,74 0,01 7,93 0,01 3,81 
l. df = 2 : 207. 
p 
0,05 
2. Refer to tables of the S~udentized Range Statistic with df = 3 : 207. 
Group ~(mean 143,68; SD 24,66) was significantly more dogmatic than groups 
A(mean 179,71; SD 26,02) and M (mean 168,0l SD 26,41). M again was sig-
nificantly more dogmatic than A but significantly less than group L. 
Hunt (1972) suggested that the relationships between religiosity and other 
personality variables might vary depending on the particular religious 
orientation involved. Thus, if type of religious orientation (e.g., Lite-
ral vs. Mythological) is important, these comparisons should show dif:fe-
rences. 
These findings (see table 3.5) are supportive of Hunt's notion that diffe-
ring pro-religious orientations might be dif:f~rentially· related to perso-












was less so and group A the least. Poythress (1975) failed to find 
support for Hunt's notion, but this may be due to the modified scale 
he used. 
3.5 Sixteen Personality Factors (16 PF.) 
On six of the primary factors (E, F, G, L, M and Q1) and on two of the 
secondary factors (QIIand QIV), there were significant (p < 0,05) dif-
ferences between the groupso See table 3.6. and graph 2. 
When comparing the mean scores of Group L with the mean scores of the 
Roman Catholic Priest profile and the profile of the Roman Catholic 
Brothers as reported by Cattell et alo (1970) there is a marked aimi-













Analysis of variance of the 3 groups L, A and M on the 20 factors of 
the 16 PF, and comparisons between groups L and. A, A and M, and L and M. 
L vs A A vs M Lvs M 
Factors Fl p t2 p t p t p 
A 2,57 NS NS NS NS 
B 0,63 NS NS NS NS 
c 0,89 NS NS NS NS 
E 13,91 0,01 7,14 0,01 3,17 NS 3,97 0,05 
F 4,23 0,05 3,13 NS 0,77 NS 3,91 0,05 
G 14,5 0,01 7,59 0,01 3,28 NS 4,31 0,01 
H 1,44 NS NS NS NS 
I 0,24 NS NS NS NS 
L 4;03 0,05 3,93 0,05 1,26 NS 2,67 NS 
M 3,26 0,05 3,67 0,05 2,47 NS 1,21 NS 
N 2,83 NS NS NS NS 
0 1,31 NS NS NS NS 
Ql 38,42 0,01 11,84 0,01 2,71. NS 9,13 0;01 ' 
Q2 2,19 NS NS ~...i NS NS 
·.-. 
' 
Q3 1,54 NS NS NS NS 
Q4 0,31 NS NS NS NS 
QI 0,84 NS NS NS NS 
QII 3,24 0,05 3,03 NS 0,17 NS 3,2 0,05 
QIII 1,52 NS NS 
. 
NS NS 
QIV 33,32 0,01 11,49 0,01 4,89 0,01 6,6 0,01 
1 df = 2 : 207. 













Comparisons of the mean scores of groups L, A, M, R.C. Priests and 
R.C. Brothers on the 16 primary factors of the 16 PF. 
Factor Group Group Group R.C. 1 
L A M Priests 
A 5,51 4,76 5,24 4,7 
B 5,73 5,43 5,39 6,2 
c 4,84 4,41 4,8 5,0 
E 4,64 6,24 5,53 4,3 
F 4.,33 5,06 5,24 3,9 
G 5,66 3,9 4,66 5,6 
H 4,66 5,17 5,13 4,5 
I 6,5 6,26 6,44 7,4 
L 5,37 6,34 6,03 5,1 
M 5,87 6,66 6,13 5,8 
N 6,66 5,93 5,9 5,1 
0 5,67 5,9 6,2 6,6 
Ql 4,46 6,86 6,31 5,6 
Q2 5,76 6,34 5,89 5,3 
Q3 4,99 4,46 4,51 4,4 
Q4 5,7 5,89 5,99 5,7 
1 Cattell et al (1970) P• 212. N = 1707 males. 






























L VS A~ 
The differences between group L and A reached significance (p<: 0,05) 
on the following factors: E, G, L, M, Q1 and QIVo On all these factors, 
except for G, group L scored significantly lower than group A. This 
means, that group Lis more humble (E), stronger in super-ego strength 
(G), more trusting (L), practical (M), more conservative (Q1) and re-
laxed (Q1V) than members of group A. 
L vs M 
A significant difference (p < 0,05) between these two groups was reached 
on the following factors: E, F, G, Q1, QII' Qiv• On all these factors, 
except for G, group L had significantly lower scores. This means, that 
group L scored more in the direction of being humble (E), sober(F), 
conservative (Q
1
), group dependent (Q
11
), relaxed (QIV) and stronger 
super-ego strength (G), than the members of group M. These findings 
.are again supportive of Hunt's (1972) notion that differing pro-religious 
orientations might be differentially related to personality variableso 
A vs M 
The only factor on which the differences between groups A and M reached 
significance (p<. 0,01) was the secondary factor QIV' where group M was 
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3.6 Behavioural Scales 
On all 6 scales chosen for this study (Devotionalism =Dev.; Church 
Attendance= C.A.; Organizational Activities= O.A.; Financial Sup-
port= F.S.; Talking and Reading about Religion= T.R.R.; and Growth 
and Striving = G.s.) there were significant differences (p < 0,01) be-
tween all three groups. See table 3.8 
TABLE 3.8 
Analysis of variance of the 3 groups.L, A and M, on the 7 scales of 
the Scale for Basic Religious Dimensions, and comparisons between 
groups L and A, A and M, and L and M. 
Scale L VS A A vs M 
L VS M 
Fl p t2 p t p t p 
Dev.3 287,3 0,01 33,84 0,01 15,07 0,01 18,76 0,01 
C.A. 224,71 0,01 29,22 0,01 8,77 0,01 20,45 0,01 
O.A. 150,73 0,01 24,l 0,01 7,76 0,01 16,33 0,01 
:P.S. 99,29 0,01 19,51 0,01 6,27 0,01 13,24 0,01 
T.R.R. 118,44 0,01 21,3 0,01 6,77 0,01 14,52 0,01 
G.S. 248,75 0,01 31,36 0,01 13,05 0,01 18,32 0,01 
1 df = 2 : 207. 
2 Refer to tables of the Studentized Range Statistic with· df = 3 i 207 
3 Dev = Devotional; C.A. = Church Attendance; O.A. = Organizational 
Activities; F.S. =Financial Support; T.R.R. = Talking and Reading 












There was a significant difference (p<. 0,01) between groups Land A, 
L and M, and A and M. Group L scored consistently lower than groups A 
and M, meaning that group L is a more active group than the otherso A 
low score meaning higher activity in that area e.g. a low score on 
Church Attendance (C.A.) means a high frequency of church attendanceo 
Group A scored consistently higher than group M and group M scored con-





















Mean scores for the three groups L, A, and M on the 6 scales of the 
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4.1 Background Variables 
There were ten background variables which distinguished the three groups 
L, A and M. These were: 
(i) the extent to which an inner religious awakening was experienced; 
(ii) the religious self-rating item; 
(iii) influence of church teachings; 
(iv) influence of school and university groups; 
{v) influence or· school and university camps; 
(vi) influence of friends of own age; 





and father's belief; 
comparing your own religious sentiments and needs with those of 
other young people of your own age; and 
the extent to which your religious views caused you to feel 
isolated or embarrassed from your contemporaries. 
On some of the other variables, e.go the influence of religious camps, 
there was an expected differentiation between groups L and A, but not 
between groups Land Mo_ This is due to the fact that groups Land A 
tended to score in opposite directions. 
Taking the above-mentioned ten background variables, we then have three 












Group L (Literal) 
Thia group reported to have had an experience of a definite inner reli-
gious awakening, or as Allport et alo (1948) termed it, "a distinct reli-
gious conversion" (p. 6). This means that there was e distinct point in 
time at which a definite decision was made in favour of religion. Unfor-
tunately, we do not know what exactly precipitated this change. This 
warrants a study on its own. 
They more often rated themselves to be "very religious"o It is impossi-
ble to determine what is meant here by "religious", but taking into account 
that there was a distinct religious awakening in this group, this self-
rating is no surpriseo 
This group rates their· own firmness (or depth) of religion as more firm 
than that of their parents or friends of their own age. Although Allport 
et al. (1948) reported that students seldom regarded themselves as more 
religious than they believe their parents to be, Allport et al. did not 
distinguish between different religious involvement groups as was done 
in this study. However, groups L and M did not rate themselves to be 
more religious than their parents althQugh they felt that they had more 
depth than their parents. It is, therefore, important, for further re-
search, to take note of these three items, as they tend to be powerful 
discriminators between different religious orientationso 
The factors having the most significant influence on their religious 
background were: (i) church teachings; (ii) university and school 
groups; (iii) religious camps and (iv) friends of own age. The first 
three are of an institutional nature, requiring participation on the 
student's part. The last factor might refer back to these camps and 
groups where contemporaries might have formed the nucleus of the parti-












line the importance training still holds in influencing people religious-
ly. 
On the tenth variable this group felt that their religious views, no 
matter what they were, marked them off from their contemporaries in such 
a way that they sometimes felt embarrassed or isolatedo This finding is 
in accordance to the Allport et al. (1948) studyo They attribute this 
to the fact that the religious group is a minority group and that the 
developing personality has to come to terms with thiso This could also 
be true for this sample, as the mean age is 19,95 and they also form a 
minority group on the campus, which could contribute to their self-cons-
ciousness in this respect. 
Group L is thus a distinct religious group who rated themselves to be 
very religious, with more depth than their parents and friends, who had 
been strongly influenced by church teachings, religious camps and groups 
and by their contemporaries. They have experienced a definite religious 
awakening and sometimes felt self-conscious because of their religious 
views. 
Group A (Anti-literal) 
Thia group, as hypothesized, tended to score in the opposite direction 
to group L. 
They more often reported not to have had an experience of an inner reli-
gious awakening and, rated themselves not to be religious. It is, there-
fore, understandable that church teachings, religious groups and camps 
and their friends as factors influencing them, did not "apply" to them. 
Their firmness (or depth) of belief in religion was less firm than that 
of their parents and friends. They also did not experience feelings of 












On these t~n background variables, group A formed a distinct areligious 
group as they rated themselves not to be religious at all. 
Group M (Mythological) 
Group M tended to score mid-way between groups L and A, but were inclined 
to score in the direction of group A on some variables. 
They felt that their religious awakening was more gradual. There was no 
single or specifiable occasion that was decisive in causing this awakening. 
They rated themselves to be "moderately religious", and that the firmness 
(or depth) of their belief in religion was about the same as their parents, 
but more firm than their contemporaries. However, group L was more con-
vinced than group M, that their belief was firmer than their contempo-
raries. 
Church teachings, religious groups and camps, and friends of own age, had 
a ttslight 11 influence in their religious upbringing. However, this in-
fluence was marked enough to distinguish them from group A, who reported 
no influence at allo 
Group M did not experince feelings of embarrassement or isolation. 
Thus we have a group who rated themselves as moderately religious, more· 
so than their contemporaries but not more than their parents. Factors 
influencing their religious views were slight and they did not feel self-
conscious of their views. Although they formed a separate group on the 













According to the ten background variables~ we have two clear groups L 
and A and a group M which lies between these two groups, but more to the 
side of group A. 
4.2 Hypothesis I Group L vs M 
Hypothesis I (i): Intensity of Belief Scale: 
Subjects with a high literal involvement will differ 0.significantly from 
subjects with a high mythological involvement on the Intensity of Belief 
Scale. Subjects with a literal involvement will hold religious beliefs 
with a higher intensity than subjects with a mythological involvemento 
Thie hypothesis was supported in that on 4 of the 7 scales, Group L had 
a significantly higher degree of conviction on the religious scales Christ, 
God, Orthodox Christian Belief and General Religious Belief than group 
Mo On the last scales which measure, according to Thouless (1935), affec-
tively indifferent non-religious belief (Opinion), non-religious "tabliods" 
(Fact) and political beliefs (Miscellaneous), the hypothesis is not sup-
ported, as on Opinion and Fact there is no significant difference. On 
Miscellaneous there is a significant difference, but in the opposite di-
) 
rectionJ as hypothesised as group M tended to score with a higher degree 
of conviction than group L. 
The finding that there was a difference between the degree of conviction 
with which religious terms and non-religious items were held, is substan~ 
tiated by the findings of Thouless (1935) and Brown (1962.a). Brown is 
of the opinion that this is so, as Certainty about religious matters is 
possible because of the social support that can be evoked to sustain 
these beliefs. He further reports that in his study religious certainty 












The important factor here is that group L had a higher degree of cer-
tainty on religious items than group M. This might be due, as Brown 
(1962 a) suggested, to social support, but it could also be due to a 
closed cognitive style or personality factors. This will be discussed 
in more detail latere 
The fact that group L had a lower degree of certainty on Miscellaneous 
than group M, is difficult to explain from these results. 
HyPothesis I (ii): Dogmatism Scale 
Subjects with a high literal involvement will differ significantly from 
subjects with a high mythological involvement on the Dogmatism Scale. 
Literal subjects will be more dogmatic ·than mythological subjects. 
Thie hypothesis is supported in that there is a significant difference 
(p< 0,01) on dogmatism between groups Land M. According to Rokeach 0s 
(1960) hypothesis, group L was more dogmatic than group M, therefore, 
group L used a more closed cognitive style than group M. This might 
explain the difference in degree of certainty of religious beliefs as 
mentioned above. 
' 
Hunt (1972) suggested that the relationship between religiosity and other 
personality variables might vary, depending on the particular religious 
orientation involved. The above measure supports Hunt's notion. 
Poythress (1975), in a study similar to the present one, was unable to 
support Hunt's notion. He found that within pro-religious groups, type 
of religious commitment (Literal or Mythological) at either primary or 
secondary level, is not differentially related to any of the personality 
variables (authoritarianism or prejudice) he used in his study~ 
HoHever, it was felt that a.more sensitive measure of personality factors 
should be used to test Hunt's hypothesis and therefore, the 16 PF was 












Hypothesis I (iii): 16 PF 
Subjects with a high literal involvement will differ significantly 
from subjects with a high mythological involvement on the factors 
of the 16 PF. 
The hypothesis of a significant difference (p<. 0,05) between groups L 
and M was supported on four of the 16 primary factors, and on two of 
the secondary factors. On the remaining factors the hypothesis was not 
supported. 
The significant factors were E, F, G, Q1, QII and Q111 • On factor E, 
group L was more submissive (obedient, mild, easily led, docile, accomo-
dating) than group M. On factor F, group M tended to be more surgent 
(enthusiastic, happy-go-lucky) and group L to be desurgent (sober, serious). 
Factor G revealed that group L was higher on super-ego strength (conscien-
tious, persistent, moralistic) than group M. In psychoanalytic terms, 
this would mean a tendency to drive the ego and to restrain the ido 
Group L tended, on factor Q1, to be conservative of temperament (con-
servative, respecting 1 established ideas, tolerant of traditional diffi-
culties), whereas group M was more radical of temperament (experimenting, 
liberal, analytical, free-thinking). On the secondary factor QII' group 
M scored higher on anxiety than group L, and on QIV group L showed the 
tendency to be more subdued than group M. 
These six factors, therefore, demonstrate that when more sensitive measu-
rements of personality variables are used, there is a difference between 
pro-religious orientations as Hunt suggested. Group L was more subdued, 
less anxious, more conservative in temperament, stronger in super-ego 
strength, more submissive and less surgent than group M. 
We could thus speak of group L as a more submissive less assertive, less 













a restricted (inhibited), less outgoing groupo This reminds one of the 
description Becker (1964) gave of children who grew up in a warm but 
restrictive atmosphereo He described these children as polite and well-
behaved, but nevertheless more inhibited, more dependent and less crea-
tive. 
' 
The above pattern of upbringing is often found in authoritarian homes. 
There is a marked similarity between the findings of Becker (1964) and 
Weigert and Thomas (1972), where the latter authors reported that adoles-
cents receiving a high degree of both support (positive affect) and con~ 
trol (dis~ipline) tend to have the highest self-esteem, to conform most 
to parental expectations, and to adhere most strongly to traditional 
forms of rel~giosity. Weller et al. (1975) is of the opinion that autho-
ritarian individuals are more attracted to orthodox doctrine than less 
authoritarian people. This hypothesis, it seems, is supported by this 
study. 
Group M seems to be a more out-going, creative group with less ego-strength 
' I' 
but with more anxiety. Becker (1964) is of the .opinion that an upbrin-
ging where there is· a reasonable amount of freedom coupled with lots of 
parental warmth, is more likely to result in children who are outgoing, 
creative, assertive and less neat and polite, but resulting in adults 
\ 
capable of acting and thinking for themselveso 
It would be interesting to make a study of the way in which subjects of 
groups Land M were brought up, but unfortti.nately it does not fall with~ 
in the scope of this study. 
Rokeach (1960), with his Dogmatism scale, measures the extent to which· 
a person's belief system is open,or closed, which he defines as being 
"the extent to which the person can receive_,evaluate, and act on rele-
vant :information received from the outside on its own intrinsic merits, 












the person or from the outside" (p. 57)o 
It seems more likely then that group L will accept religious statements 
within their religious paradigm without questioning them, but that group 
M will be more free and willing to question, and reinterpret the state-
men ts. 
H:ypothesis I (iv): Scale for Basic Religious Dimensions 
Subjects with a high literal involvement will differ significantly 
from subjects with a high mythological involvement on the 6 scales 
of the Scale for Basic Religious Dimensions. Literal Subjects will 
be more active in religious activities than mythological subjects. 
The hypothesis of a significant difference (p<. 0,01) between groups L 
and M was supported on all six scales. Group L was always more involved 
than group M. 
Group L was more active in prayer life and more concerned about their 
relationship with God. They attended church more frequently, were more 
involved in organizational activities, they supported the church better 
financially, they showed more openness for growth and change in their 
religious beliefs, and they were more active in reading and talking 
about religion than group M. 
Although King and Hunt (1969, 1972a, 1972b, 1975) have done extensive 
research with this scale, it has always been administered to White 
main-line Protestant groups, without trying to distinguish different 
orientations within their samples. Therefore, there are no other data 
available with which one can compare the findings of this researcho 
However the findings of this research are not surprising, as the L 
group has been identified as a group which holds their religious beliefs 












(dogmatic), is more submissive and an active group in religious matters. 
Group M again, holds their religious beliefs with a lower degree (than 
group L) of certainty, operates with a less closed cognitive system, is 
more assertive and not so active in religious matters. 
Hunt (1972) suggests that the M orientation represents most moderate to 
liberal Christian groups and according to him this may be considered to 
be the most mature type of involvement. Unfortunately we do not know on 
what basis "maturity" is assigned, therefore we cannot take part in this 
judgement between groups L and M. 
4o3 Hypothesis II. Group L vs A 
Hypothesis II (i): Intensity of Belief Scale 
Subjects with a high literal involvement will differ significantly 
from subjects with a high anti-literal involvement on the Intensity 
of Belief Scale. Subjects with a literal involvement will hold reli-
gious beliefs with a high degree of conviction, and the anti-literal 
subjects will reject the religious beliefso 
This hypothesis was supported for the four religious scales, Christ, 
God, Orthodox Christian Beliefs and General Religious Belief, in that 
. ' 
group L accepted these items with a high degree of certainty, and group 
A rejected these items with a high degree of conviction. 
For the last three non-religious belief scales, Opinion, Fact and Mis-
cellaneous, there was a significant difference (p< 0,05) between the 
means of group L and A on Opinion and Miscellaneous. However, the hy-
pothesis is not supported as the direction of conviction is reversed. 
Group A now tended to accept these statements with a higher degree of 












HYpothes1s II (11)1 Dogmatism Scale 
Subjects with a high literal involvement will not differ significantly 
from subjects with a high anti-literal involvement on Dogmatism. It 
is expected that both groups operate with a closed cognitive system. 
The hypothesis of no difference is not supported by these findings. 
Group L tended to be more dogmatic than group A. Thia does not support 
Hunt's (1972) notion that Anti-literal subjects reject religion on the 
basis ot a literal, naive, unexamined interpretation of religion - thus 
using a closed cognitive system. In fact, in this study, it was found 
that anti-literal subjects used a more open cognitive system. 
Hunt's interpretation that L subjects might not have examined the rela-
tionship of their religious statements to other areas of their lives, 
and accept any religious statement at face value without in any way 
questioning it (closed cognitive system), is supported by these findings. 
The finding that group L (a religious group) is more author~tarian than 
group A (a non-religious group), is also supported by various researchers. 
(Brown, 1962a; Stanley, 1963; Weller et al. 1975; Poythress, 1975). 
Brown (1962a) is of the opinion that the relationship between belief and 
church membership, attitudinal acceptance of the Church and authorita-
rianism, in his research, suggests that strong social support is required 
for the maintenance of a system of religious belief. Another important 
tact might be that authoritarianism is used as a "defence mechanism" 
to protect the minority group (here group L) and to give it a feeling 
of superiority (security). Weller et al. (1965), in his study of reli-
giosity and authoritarianism in a Jewish community, found no support for 
the hypothesis that authoritarianism develops out ot differing sociali-












children are brought up, but.felt that it was the current religious state, 
and not the religious background, that was the link in authoritarianism. 
Therefore, they concluded that authoritarian individuals were more attrac-
ted to orthodox doctrine, than that orthodox believers became authorita-
rian through being conditioned by a doctrine which is authoritarian. A 
final conclusion about the correlation between religiosity and authori-
tarianism awaits further research. 
Hypothesis II (iii) 16 PF 
Subjects with a high literal involvement and subjects with a high anti-
literal involvement will deviate to the same degree from the mean on 
the personality factors of the 16 PF. 
The hypothesis of no-difference between groups L and A, was supported on 
eleven of the sixteen primary factors, and on three of the four eecon-
dary factors. However, the hypothesis was not supported on the remaining 
factors E, G, L, M, Q1 and Qiv• When interpreting these factors, we 
found that group L was more submissive (E) than group A, where group A 
tended to be dominant (assertive, aggressive, competitive). On factor 
G, group L rated higher on super-ego strength (conscientious, persistent, 
moralistic) than group A. On factor L again, group L was more alaxia 
(trusting, accepting conditions) than group A, where group A tended to 
be protension (suspecting and jealous). On factor M, group A was ~~.~~ 
autia (imaginative, Bohemian, absent-minded) than group L. Oh factor Q1 , 
group L was conservative of temperament (conservative, respecting esta-
blished ideas) and group A was radical (experimenting, liberal, analytical, 
free thinking). On the secondary factor QIV' group A was more indepen-
dent (radical, autistic) and group L was more subdued. 
These six factors then reveal a meaningful difference between group L 
· and A on personality variables. Group L, is more submissive, with higher 
super-ego strength, is trusting, lees imaginative, conservative and sub-












suspecting and jealous, more imaginative, radical and independent. (Com-
pare this with Hypothesis I (iii) P• 69.) 
Hypothesis II (iv) Scales for Basic Religious Dimensions 
Subjects with a high literal involvement will differ significantly from 
subjects with a high antiliteral involvement on the 6 scales of the 
Scales for Basic Religious Dimensions. Literal subjects will be more 
active in religious activities than anti-literal subjectso 
On all six variables, e.g. church attendance, financial support, talking 
and reading about religion, etc., the hypothesis of a significant diffe-
rence (p < 0,01) between the means of groups L and A on religious acti-
vities was supported. 
Thie is quite an obvious finding as group A, as a non-religious group, 
was not expected to take part in religious institutional activities to 
the same degree as group L. 
4.4 Hypothesis III: Group A vs M 
Hypothesis III (i): Intensity of Belief Scale 
Subjects with a high anti-literal involvement will differ significantly 
from subjects with a high mythological involvement on the Intensity of 
Belief Scale. Subjects with a anti-literal involvement will reject re-
ligious beliefs whereas mythological subjects will hold these beliefs 
with a high degree of conviction. 
This hypothesis was supported at the 0,01 level for the four religious 
scales, Christ, God, Orthodox Christian Beliefs, and General Religious 
Belief. Group M accepted these items with a higher degree of conviction 
than group A. 
The last three non-religious belief scales, Opinion, Fact and Miscella-
neous, proved non-significant differences between the means of group A 











This finding of a significant difference between religious beliefs but 
not between general beliefs, supports the results of Brown's (1962a) re-
search. His study points towards religious belief as being a relatively 
isolated cognitive system, in which intensity of belief is independent of 
the strength of opinions about other matters. He found that it is not 
religious belief measures which have high loadings on personality factors, 
but opinion and factual scores. Therefore, one could postulate that we 
are dealing here with two different cognitive styles and different per-
sonality factors. This will be discussed under Hypothesis III (ii) and 
(iii). 
Hypothesis III (ii): Dogmatism Scale 
' Subjects with a high anti-literal involvement will differ significantly 
from subjects with a high mythological involvement on the Dogmatism 
Scale. Anti-literal subjects will tend to operate with a more closed 
cognitive system than mythological subjects. 
This hypothesis is supported in that there is a significant difference 
(p <. 0,05) on dogmatism between groups A and M. However, the direction 
as suggested by the hypothesis is not supported in that group M was more 
dogmatic than group A. This might explain the abovementioned findings 
that religious belief stateme·nts are accepted or rejected with a high 
degree of conviction but general belief statements are not. Group M 
uses a more closed cognitive system than group A, but they only differ 
in degree of conviction on religious belief, and not on non-religious 
beliefs. This supports Raschke's (1973) theory that there is an under-
lying cognitive style which an individual possesses that is consistent 
with the manner is which h_e holds his religious beliefs. Rokeach (1960) 
is of the opinion that a closed system is developed in childhood. There-
fore, Raschke (1973) inclines to view that cognitive style exercises 
greater influence over religious attitudes than religious attitudes exer-












variables are temporally prior, but the above seems, at present, to be 
the most logical. 
Hypothesis III (iii)s 16 PF 
Subjects with a high anti-literal involvement will differ significantly 
from subjec~s with a high mythological involvement On the personality 
factors of the 16 PF. · 
All sixteen primary personality factors as well as three secondary fac-
tors, failed to reach a point of significant difference. The hypothesis 
of difference between means of the two groups is, therefore, not sup-
ported. 
Only on QIV' a secondary personality factor, was there a significant dif-
ference (pc: 0,01) between groups A and M. Group A was more independent 
(radical;, autistic, a law to himself) than group M. 
We can conclude that there were no real meaningful differences of per-
sonality factors on this measure, between groups A and M, except that 
group A was more independent than group M. This then again supports 
Brown's (1962a) notion that it is not religious belief measures (in which 
groups A and M differ) which have high loadings on personality factors 
(where groups A and M hardly differ), but rather opinion and factual 
scores (where groups A and M don't differ). 
HYpothesis III (iv): Scales for Basic Religious Dimensions 
Subjects with a high mythological involvement will differ significantly 
from subjects with a high anti-litaral involvement on the 6 scales of 
the Scales for Basic Religious Dimensions. Mythological subjects will 
be more active in religious activities than anti-literal subjects. 
On all six variables, e.g. financial support, church attendance, organi-
zational activities, talking and.reading about religion, etc., the hypo-
thesis is supported in that group A will be less active in religious mat-












non-religious group and will be active in non-religious activit~es. 
We can now distinguish between these three groups by summarizing the 
findingso 
GROUP L 
These subjects rated themselves to be very religious, even more so than 
their parents and friends. They were strongly influenced by church teach-
ings, religious camps and groups and by their contemporaries. They have 
experienced a definite religious awakening and are sometimes embarrassed 
or isolated because of their belief. They hold their religious convic-
tions with a high degree of certainty and they tend to make use of a 
closed cognitive style, thus being dogmatic. 
As a .group they were submissive, sober (serious), had strong ego strength. 
They were trusting, conservative and subdued. They were very active in 
religious matters, such as devotionalism, and high church attendance. 
They participated in organizational activities, supported the church 
financially. They talked and read about religion, and had an openness 
for growth and change in religious views. 
GROUP A 
This is primarily a non-religious group. These subjects rated themselves 
as not religious. They rejected religious statements with a high degree 
of conviction and they used a more open cognitive style. 
As a group they were assertive, had low super-ego strength, were radical 













Thie is a religious group (as group L), but with lesser conviction, ac-
tivity and intensity than group L. These subjects rated themselves to 
be moderately religious, more religious than their contemporaries, but 
not more than their parents. Church teachings, religious groups and 
camps, and friends of own age only had a slight influence on their reli-
gious views. They did not feel embarrassed or isolated because of their 
religious views and they accepted religious statements with a mild (com-
pared to group L) degree of conviction. They operated with a more open 
(compared to group L) cognitive style. 
As a group they were radical and independent and, although they partici-
pated in religious activities, they did it to a lesser degree than group 
L. 
Although Hunt (1972), Poythress (1975), as well as this research, were 
able to distinguish three different groups, the Mythological group still 
presents a problem. Th.is group is not always clearly separable from 
either group L and/or group A. The reason for this might be in the LAM 
scale itself, and it would be wise to start at this point. 
Hunt's break with the old simplistic and literal approach to measuring 
religious orientation is of the highest importance. Unfortunately, Hunt 
is unable to break completely from the old approach as he only permits 
the subject one kind of interpretation. The symbolic or mythical inter-
pretation which Hunt makes ave~lable, is largely immanent in its orien-
t 
~-/ tation. It provides a this-wordly interpretation of religious symbols, 
mostly in humanistic categories. This is certainly one possible inter-
pretation, but it reduces religious symbols to general ethical principles 












cations. As was pointed out in Chapter One, that the transcendental im-
plication is of vital importance. It should be perfectly possible to 
interpret symbolically myths in such a way that the transcendental refe-
rent remains. The symbol is then seen as a statement about the nature 
of the "Ganz Andere" and, as such, both a statement of and a path to the 
transcendent. As the scale is designed now, only the literalists are 
given an opportunity to vote for the transcendent. 
Let me illustrate my point by considering some of Hunts items. 
ITEM 4 (see Appendix II) The Miracles 
According to most New Testament scholars the miracles are not intended 
to be proof but are signs. Hence, one could see the miracle stories as 
signs of the intervention of God in the person of Jesus. 
ITEM 5., The virgin birth 
The symbol of the Virgin birth may mean that God was present in Jesus 
in a way decisevely different from the way God is present in the rest 
of us. 
ITEM 13. Prophecy 
Prophecy does not have to do with future events in concrete detail but 
it does reveal the plan of God's involvement in human events. 
These examples will suffice. The responses described above are responses 
of those who may choose to listen very carefully to the symbol and accept 
its "signal of transcendence"- to use Berger's (1974) phrase - while at 
the same time not accepting its literal interpretation - Greeley (1972) 
suggests that another dimension should be added which he, for want of a 












Permitting the subject only one kind of interpretation, I feel would 
force an individual to distinguish between a "literal" and "mythological" 
interpretation which, were he to be confronted with those interpretations 
independently, he might not make. This is particularly important in the 
case of the individual who is "indiscriminately proreligious" (Allport 
and Rose, 1967), or the individual whose religious concepts are so vague 
and confused that he might not distinguish between L and M statements, 
were he forced to do so. Therefore,. it is suggested that for further 
research a Likert format be used in order to assess degrees of L, A, and 
M religious orientations independently~ Thie could be done by creating 
three Likert statements from each of the original LAM items by incorpo-
rating the three response alternatives into the basic religious state-
ment. This format would allow pure L, A, and M types to emerge in cases 
where the individuals are conceptually clear enough to distinguish the 
commitment types on their own. It would not force them to do so. It 
also allows for the identification of mixed types without a reduction in 
strength (or degree) of involvement. 
Poythress (1975) is further of the opinion that by its very nature the 
mythological orientation is more subject to individual idiosyncrasy than 
either the literal or anti-literal orientations. This is a grave problem 
for anyone who wants to construct a measure to measure a mythological 
orientation. 
In connection with the anti-literal group it 1 1s also felt that it is un-
fair to group all the "non'e" in one group. Poythress (l.975) already 
demonstrated a difference between what he termed non-religious and anti-
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Thie is a study of religious beliefs, attitudes and behaviour. 
We are trying to gain more knowledge about this complex area. 
We are interested in 6 areas: 1. namely some personal background in-
formation; 2o your religious commitment; 3o your attitudes and be-
liefs; 4. your opinion; 5o your interests, and 6; your religious 
experiences. We would therefore appreciate your own true answers to 
these questions. There are no "right" or "wrong" answers, because 
everyone has the right to his own views. There is also no reason for 
trying to present a "good" religious picture as this "good picture" 
might be to others a "less good picture". We would like to encourage 
you to be frank and open, as this will only help our understanding of 
the psychology of religion, and will serve to Hie glory. 
Almost all the questions are self-rating questio~s, in which 
you indicate to what extent you agree or disagree. Follow the instruc-
tions as carefully as possible. There is no time limit, but we suggest 
that you work as rapidly as possiblea Do not discuss the questions 
with your friends until you have completed this questionnaire. All 
information will be confidential. 
























Make an X in the appropriate box. 
Date e • • • • • • • • • • •· • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
1. Date of birth : •••••••••••••••••••• 
2. Marital status : 0 unmarried 0 married D divorced. 
3. Sex: 0 Male D female. 














1. Of the following statements please check the statement whioh most 
nearly describes your own experience. 
a) I consider that my present religious commitment is a gradual 
outgrowth of many years of religious instruction and training 
and that I cannot point to any single event in my life which 
wrought a definite change from unbelief to belief. ao CJ 
b) Although there was a time in my life when I had no religious 
belief, the change from unbelief to belief has been a gradual 
oneo b. D 
c) Although I have always held some religious beliefs I can vividly 
recall the occasion when I became more vitally committed to 
these beliefs. Co [] 
d) There was a time in my life when religion had no interest for 
me and I can attribute my present religious commitment to a 
distinct point in my life at which I made a definite decision 
in favour of religiono d. 0 
2o I consider myself to bes 
0 very religious 0 quite religious D moderately religious 
CJ not very religious c:J not at all religious. 
3. On the whole I would say that my father was : · 
0 very religious 0 religious D indifferent 
0 antagonistic D very antagonistic. 
4. On the whole I would eay that my mother was : 
D very religious LJ religious D indifferent 
0 antagonistic D very antagonistico 
5. If at any time you have felt yourself to be religious how did the 
following factors influence you and to what degree did they con-















Influence of mother 
Influence of father 
Conformity with tradition 
Influence of other re la ti ves __ _ 
Gratitude 
Studies in school or college __ _ 
Church teachings 
Aesthetic appeal 
Univerei ty/College/School groups _ 
Religious camps 
Influence of friends of own age ~ 

















































6. To what degree has religion been an influence in your upbringing? 
D very marked D moderate D slight D none at allo 
7. How, in general, does the firmness (or depth) of your belief in 
rellglon compare with your mother's belief? 
more firm [] about the same [] less firm [] don't know. 
8. How, in general, does the firmness (or depth) of your belief in 
religion compare with your father's belief? 
[] more firm [] about the same C=:J less firm 0 don't know. 
9. How would you say that your own religious sentiments and needs com-
pare with those of other young people of your own age? 
CJ stronger than or l:J about average or [] lees than average. 
10. Do you feel that your views regarding religion, no matter what they 
are, in any way mark you off from your oonte~poraries, so that you 
sometimes feel embarrassed or isolated because of these views? 




























Select one of the 3 answers for each statement and mark X in the appro-
priate C:J • 
Be sure to answer all statements. 
l. I believe in God the Father Almighty, maker of heaven and earth. 
Agree, since available evidence proves that God made 
* everything. (L) 
Disagree, since available evidence suggests some type of 
spontaneous creation for which it is unnecessary to assume 
a God to create. (A) 
c=J 3. Agree, but only in the sense that this is an anthropomorphic 
way of talking a.bout whatever Process, Being, or Ultimate 
Concern stands behind the creative process. (M) 
2. I believe that men working and thinking together can build a just 
society without supernatural help. 
[] lo Disagree, since man without God's help can do very little 
that is good. (L) 
[] 2. Agree, since men have and are increasing the ability and 
technical knowledge to improve society if they will apply 
this knowledge to the problems of society. (A) 
D 3. ·Disagree, al though men's ability and technical knowledge 
is increasing, they must build on the ultimate power 
within oneself(sio) to understand and accomplish the full 
implications of justice and a good society. (M) 
3. The writings of such commentators on human life as Plato, Aristotle, 
Dante, and Shakespeare are as much inspired as are the writings of 
Moses and Paul. 
[]' 1. Disagree, because the writings of Moses and Paul contain 
a special inspiration from God which other human writings 
do not have. (L) 
D 2.· 
D 3. 
Agree, since there is really little difference in these 
writings. In fact, Plato and Aristotle may be even more 
important for us than Moses and Paul. (A) 
Disagree, although any writing may be inspired, the writings 
of Moses and Paul are especially significant because they 











4. All miracles in the Bible are true. 
o,. 
Agree, because the Bible cannot contain any false report 
of God's word. (L) 
Disagree, since "miracles" can be explained by our modern 
understanding of the principles by which nature and human 
society operate. (A) 
Agree, but only in the sense that "miracles" are a dra-
matic report and interpretation of a natural process, 
with the literary purpose of pointing to the sovereignty 
of God. (M) 
5o Jesus was born of the Virgin in a manner different from human beings. 
[] 1. Disagree, although most religions claim a Virgin birth 
for their founder, we know that such an event is physically 
impossible. (A) 
Agree, but only in the sense that this is an ancient my-
thological way of talking about the Ultimate Reality as 
manifested in Jesus. (M) 
Agree, since God conceived Jesus in Mary's womb before 
she had sexual relationship with Joseph, her husband. {L) 
6. The attempt to believe in a supernatural being is a sign of a per-
sons' s failure to accept responsibility for his own life. 
[] 1. Agree, since belief in God.is usually an escape from the 
problems of everyday life. Such belief does nothing to 
help solve one's problems. (A) 
~ 2. Disagree, because belief in God is really the only way 
in which man can be saved and make hie life worthwhile. (L) 
c=J 3. Disagree, since belief in God is basically man's way of 
talking about his full acceptance of personal responsi-
bility in the face of ultimate and sometimes uncertain 
real! ty. (M) 
7, I believe in the guidance of the Holy Spirit. 
[] 1. Agree, since God has said that he will be with us always. 













Disagree, since the supernatural, if it exists at all, 
is in no way directly involved in telling man what to 
do. (A) 
Agree, because this is one way of describing the involve-
ment of God with hie creation and man. (M) 
8. The chief end of man is to glorify God and enjoy him forever. 
Agree, since God created man and expects man to do God's 
will at all times. (L) 
Disagre~, since man must find his own purposes in life. 
There are probably no purposes for man ~hich are apparent 
in nature. (A) 
[] 3. Agree, because the essential purpose of God is that man 
achieve his own maximum fulfillment through personal de-
velopment and service to others. (M) 
9. I believe Hell is a form of existence in a future life. 
Disagree, since Hell is not a future life existence, but 
rather a present state in this life which occurs when man 
disregards his own code of ethic~ and/or the rights of 
other individuals. (M) 
Disagree, since there is little, if any, evidence for 
any type of existence after this life. (A) 
Agree, since there is ample evidence in the Bible and 
other authoritative sources for Hell as a form of future 
existence. (L) 
10. The four gospels, Matthew, Mark, Luke and John, contain some legen-
dary materials. 
[] 1. Agree, since moat of the material in the gospels cannot 
be supported by other historical sources or is not re-
levant to life in todays'a world. (A) 
[] 2. Disagree, since nothing in the four gospels could be 
legendary or in error, because these are part of the 
Bible and therefore infallible~ (L) 
0 3. Agree, but this does not deny the basic purpose of the 
gospels, which is to use written language (however inade-















We were made for fellowship with God and our hearts are restless 
until they rest in him. 
CJ lo Agree, although this is merely a way of talking about 
the ultimate nature of man's activities as being in some 
way related to God's purposes. (M) 
[] 2. Disagree, since man's restlessness results from his in-
ability to identify with a group of persona and enjoy 
people about him, not in a supposed relation to some 
God. (A) 
o,. Agree, since God's basic purpose in creating man is so 
that man can be a companion to God. (L) 
12. Man is saved by the free gift of God's grace. 
CJ 1. Agree, since the Bible clearly states that salvation is 
by man's faith in God and his grace. (L) 
c:J2. Disagree, since whatever salvation there is must come 
through man's work in the world about him. (A) 
0 3. Agree, since this is a traditional expression which )" 
really refers to the unconditional nature of God's grace 
toward man. (M) 
13. The biblical writers were endowed with a divine wisdom which 
enabled them to foretell specific events in the distant future. 
c:J1. Disagree, since the basic purpose of prophecy in the 
Bible was to announce God's judgement of the ways in 
which that present generation failed to act in harmony 
with God's purposes for man. (M) 
Agree, since many of these prophecies either came true 
in earlier history, in the Bible, or are coming true in 
the world today. (L) 
CJ 3. Disagree, since the biblical writers had no greater wis-
dom than other men of their dayo 'Any prophecies which 
may have come true were the result of a knowledge of cause 
and effect which any man could achieve. (A) 
14e Man is ultimately responsible to God. 
[:J 1. Disagree, because man is finally responsible only to 












c:J 2o Agree, because thie is a way of describing the basic as-
sumption upon which all other concepts of responsibility 
depend. (M) 
Agree, because God has created man in his image and expects 
man to do God's willo (L) 
15. God ie only a symbol of man's ideals. 
[] l. Disagree, although man's experiences may by symbolized 
in the image of God, the reality of God always transcends 
man's symbols for that reality. (M) 
[]2. Agree, since religious men tend to ascribe to God their 
own highest ideals. (A) 
l:J 3. Disagree, since there is clear evidence for a real God 
who is much more than just the result of man's rational 
powers. (L) 
16. Jesus walked on water and raised the dead. 
Disagree, since these are probably exaggerated reports 
of events which could be explained through our knowledge 
of nature. (A) 
Agree, since there are several accounts in which Jesus 
actually brought a physically dead person back to life. 
These accounts provide evidence for God's power over 
nature. (L) 
c:I 3. Agree, but only in the sense that these are figurative 
ways of describing man's awareness of the meaning of 
life in relation-to the revelation of God. (M) 
17. The biblical story of creation is probably based on one of the 
early Babylonian myths. 
C:J 1. Agree, but the basic purpose of the creation story is 
to symbolize God' a creative and redemptive relatio·n to 
the universe and to man. (M) 
Disagree, since the biblical story of creation has not 
been duplicated in any way at any time. It refers to 












Agree, since most religions provide such a creation 
story. Modern scientific theories of the origin of 
the universe have replaced these ancient accounts. (A) 
LO AD 
Not included on the questionnaire the subject completed. 

























ATTITUDES . AND ... · BELIEFS. 
Read each statement carefully and decide if it is true or false or to 
which degree it is true or false. If you are completely sure that the 
statement is true, make the X in the box number l; if you think it is 
to some extent true, make it near to true. You are actually rating 
your beliefs of how true or how false a particular statement iso 
l. (l)x There is a personal God. 
Certainly W W UJ W 
true 
2. (2) Jesus Christ was God the Son. 
Certainly UJ W · GJ W UJ 
true 
(3) There are spiritual realities of some kind. 
Certainly [TI m w 0 w m true 
4o (4) The world was created by God. 
Certainly IT] CTI Ww w 0 true 
(5) There is a personal DeviJ.. 
















Certainly . m m ITJ CD w fI] w··certainly 
true false. 
There is a God who is all-powerful. 
Certainly 0 [TI CTI GJ W [TI 
true 
There is a God who is altogether good. 
Certainly [TI 0 w 0 w 0 true 
There are such spiritual beings as angels. 







Jonah was swallowed by a great fish and afterwards emerged 
alive. 













ll. (ll) Man has been evolved from lower forms of life. 
Certainly [il 12] [lJ [j] [il [§] [1J Certainly 
true false. 
12. (12) There is an impersonal God. 
Certainly [il 12] UJ [j] UJ 
true 
DJ [1J Certainly 
false. 
l,. (13) Evil is a realityo 
Certainly GJ 12] [lJ [j] UJ DJ CI] Certainly 
true false. 
14. (14) The spirits of human beings continue to exist after the 
death of their bodies. 
Certainly UJ W LlJ GJ ~ W [1J Certainly 
true falseo 
15. (15) · Religion is the opium of the people. 
160 
Certainly [TI [}] [1J [!] ~ [I] CD Certainly 
true false. 
(16)- There is no God 
Certainly [!] 
true 
(personal or impersonal). 
l2J ClJ W UJ GJ [2J Certainly 
false. 
17. (17) The universe is expanding. 
Certainly DJ DJ [1J [TI ~ [I] CD Certainly 
true false. 
18. (18) Attendance at church is a better way of spending Sunday than 
taking a walk in the country. 
Certainly Q Ci] [iJ [iJ [iJ [§] LJ] Certainly 
true false. . .;;. 
l9o · ,. :, 9,_, Jesus changed water into wine. 
Certainly [!] []] [1J [!] UJ 
true · 
* 
[I] c=1J Certainly 
false. 
20. God made man out of dust and breathed life into him. 
Certainly [D [U UJ [!] UJ [I] c=1J Certainly 
true · false. 
*-21. There is no life after death. 
Certainly m w w w [jJ w [l] Certainly 
true false. 
22. (19) Moses was the author of the first five books of the Bible. 
Certainly [!] [.Ll [iJ GJ ~ CI] [1J Certainly 
true false. 
23. (20) Christianity is a better religion than Buddhism. 
Certainly [!] OJ Ci] [£] ~ W [1J Certainly 












24. (21) The Bible is literally true in all its parts. 
Certainly CD QJ m [[] UJ IT] []] Certainly 
true false. 
25. (22) Man is, in some degree, responsible for his actions. 
Certainly [TI W LlJ [iJ UJ ITJ [1J Certainly 
true false. 
26. (23) There is a Hell in which the wicked will be everlastingly 
punished. 
Certainly [TI W [iJ [1J GJ GJ [1J Certainly 
true false. 
27. (24) The spirits of persons who have died can sometimes communicate 
with the living. 
Certainly m IT] m !TI CD ~ m Certainly 
true false. 
28. (25) Right will triumph. 
Certainly CTI ~ [Ll GJ [1J CI] [!] Certai. nly 
true false. 
* 29. Jesus Christ was born of a Virgin. 
Certainly (J] IT] []] [TI [}] IT] [1J Certainly 
true false. 
* 30. Jesus walkedupon the water while his desciples waited for 
him in their boat. 
Certainly CTI [}] [1J [L} [I] CI] [1J Certainly 
true false. 
31. (26) Belief in evolution is compatible with belief in a Creator. 
Certainly [I] ~ m [1J (}] GJ W Certainly 
true . false. 
32. (27) Hardships strengthen character. 
Certainly [!] w [1J m ITT m [JJ Certainly 
true false. 
33. (28) Piet Retief was killed by Dingaan's soldiers between 
1840 to 1850. 
Certainly CTI QJ m m ITT m [1J Certainly 
true false. 
34. (29) Everything is relative. 
Certainly [TI 0 GJ W [U [I] [iJ Certainly 
true false. 
35. (30) Tigers are found in parts of China. 
Certainly QJ (TI m (D [TI [I] DJ Certainly 
true false. 
36. (31) Hornets live in nests under the ground. 













37. (32) Sex is evil. 
~:!ainly [TI ITJ [1J ITJ [TI ITJ 
38. (33) Light travels to us from the sun in less than 







390 (34) Bacon was the author of the plays attributed to Shakespeare. 
40. (35) 
41. (36) 
Certainly [TI ITJ UJ ITJ [TI [I] l1J Certainly 
true false. 
Gr~en is a primary colour. 
Certainly GJ [3J []] [1J LJJ [§] 
true 
Sunlight is good for human health. 






42. (37) Members of the leisured class are supported by the 'surplus 
value' created by the workerso 




43. (38) Tariffs improve trade. 




44. (39) Rhodesia has, on the whole, benefited from British rule. 
Certainly Q ITJ UJ GJ UJ OJ IT] Certainly 
true false. 
45. (40) The total national debt of South Africa is more than ten 
thousand million Rand. 




* 46. Salvation is only for Christian believers. 
Certainly [2J w [lJ [i] LJ] [TI W Certainly 
true false. 
* 47. It makes no difference whether one is a Christian or not, as 
long as one has good will for others~ 






























The following is a study of what the general public thinks and feels 
about a number of important social and personal questionao 
The best answer to each statement below is your personal opiniono 
We have tried to cover many different and opposing points of view; 
you may find yourself agreeing strongly with some of the statements, 
disagreeing just as strongly with others, and perhaps uncertain about 
others; whether you agree of disagree with any statement, you can be 
sure that many people feel the same as you do. 
Mark each statement according to how much you agree or disagree with it. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
I agree I agree I agree I disagree I dfaagree I disagree 
very on the little little on the very much 
much whole whole 
1. The United States and Russia have just about nothing in common. 
Strongly 
agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 Disagree 
strongly 
-2o The highest form of government is a democracy and the highest form 
of democracy is a ,_.government run by those who are moat intelligent. 
Strongly 
agree 
1 2· 3 4 6 Disagree 
strongly 
3. Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a worthwhile goal, 




1 2 3 4 5 6 Disagree 
strongly 
4o It is only natural that a person would have a much better acquaintance 
with ideas he believes in than with ideas he opposeso 
Strongly 1 2 3 4 5 6 Disagree 
agree strongly 
5. Man on his own is a helpless and miserable creature. 
Strongly 1 2 ·3 4 5 6 Die agree 












l 2 3 4 5 6 
I agree I agree I agree I disagree I disagree I disagree 
Ivery on the little 11 ttle on the very much 
much whole whole 
60 Fundamentally, the world we live in is a pretty lonesome place. 
Strongly 1 2 3 4 5 6 Disagree 
agree strongly 
7o Most people just don't give a "damntt for others. 
Strongly 
agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 Disagree 
strongly 
80 I'd like it, if I could find someone who would tell me how to solve 
my personal problems. 
Strongly 
agree 
1 2 4 5 6 Disagree 
strongly 
9. It is only natural for a person to be rather fearful of the future. 
Strongly 
agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 Disagree 
strongly 
lOo There is so much to be done and so little time to do it in. 
Strongly 
agree 
1 2 4 5 6 Disagree 
strongly 
11. Once I get wound up in a heated discussion I just can't stop. 
Strongly 
agree 
1 2 4 5 6 Disagree 
strongly 
12. In a discussion I often find it necessary to repeat myself several 
times to make sure I am being understood. 
Strongly 
agree 
1 2 3 4 5 ·6 Disagree 
strongly 
13. In a heated discussion I generally become so absorbed in what I am 
going to say that I forget to listen to what the others are saying. 
Strongly 
agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
14. It is better to be a dead hero than to be a live cowardo 
Strongly 
agree 
















l 2 3 4 5 6 
I agree I agree I agree I disagree I disagree I disagree 
very OD the little little on the very much 
much whole whole 
15. While I don't like to admit this even to myself, my secret ambition 
is to become a great man, like Einstein, or Beethoven, or Shakespeare. 
Strongly 
agree 
1 2 4 5 6 Disagree 
strongly 




l 2 ' 4 5 6 Disagree strongly 




l 2 .3 4 5 6 Disagree 
strongly 
18. In the history of mankind there have probably been juet a handful 






There are a number of people 
things they stand for. 
Strongly 1 2 
agree 





4 5 6 Disagree 
strongly 













21. It is only when a man devotes himself to an ideal or cause that 
life becomes meaningful. 
Strongly 
agree 
1 2 4 5 6 Disagree 
strongly 
22. Of all the different philosophies which exist in this world there is 
probably only one which is correct. 
Strongly 
agree 













l 2 3 4 5 6 
I agree I agree ·.I agree I di8agree I disagree I disagree 
very on the little little on the very much 
much whole whole 
23. A person who gets enthusiastic about too many causes is likely to 
be a pretty "wishy-washy" sort of persono 
Strongly 
agree 
l 2 4 5 6 Disagree 
strongly 
24. To compromise with our political opponents is dangerous because it 
usually leads to the betrayal of our own side. 
Strongly 
agree 
l 2 4 5 6 Disagree 
strongly 
25. When it comes to differences of opinion in religion one must be 
careful not to compromise with those who believe differently from 
the way we do. 
Strongly 
agree 
l 2 4 5 6 Disagree 
strongly 
26. In times like these, a person must be pretty selfish if he considers 
primarily his own happiness. 
Strongly 
agree 
l 2 3 4 5 6 Disagree 
strongly 
27. The worst crime a person could commit is to attack publicly the 
people who believe in the same thing he does. 
Strongly 
agree 
l 2 3 4 5 6 Disagree 
strongly 
28. In times like these it is often necessary to be more on guard against 
ideas put out by people or groups in one's own camp than by those in 
the opposing camp. 
Strongly l 2 4 5 6 Disagree 
agree strongly 
29. A group which tolerates too much differences of opinion among its 
own members cannot exist for long. 












l 2 3· 4 5 6 
I agree I agree I agree I disagree I disagree I disagree 
very on the little little on the very much 
much whole whole 
,o. There are two kinds of people in this world: those who are tor the 
truth and those who are against the truth. 
Strongly 
agree 
l 2 4 5 6 Disagree 
strongly 




l 2 4 5 6 Disagree 
strongly 




l 2 4 5 6 Disagree 
strongly 
3'· Most of the ideas which get printed nowadays aren't worth the paper 
they are printed on. 
Strongly 
agree 
l 2 4 5 6 Disagree 
strongly 
,4. In this complicated world of ours the only way we can know what's 
going on is to rely on leaders or experts who can be trusted. 
Strongly 
agree 
l 2 3 4 5 6 Disagree 
strongly 
35. It is often desirable to reserve judgement about what's going on 
until one has had a chance to hear the opinions of those one respects. · 
Strongly l 2 3 4 5 6 Disagree 
agree strongly 
36. In the long run the best way to live is to pick friends and asso-
ciates whose tastes and belief a are the same as one's own. 
Strongly l 2 3 4 5 6 Disagree 
agree strongly 
37. The present is all too often full of unhappiness. It is only the 
future that counts. 













l 2 3 4 5 6 
I agree I agree I agree I disagree I disagree I disagree 
very on the little little on the very much 
much whole whole 
38. If a man is to accomplish his mission in life it is sometimes 
necessary to gamble 11all or nothing at all"o 
Strongly 
agree 
l 2 4 5 6 Disagree 
strongly 
39. Unfortunately, a good many people with whom I have discussed impor-
tant social and moral problems don't really understand what's going 
on. 
?' 
Strongly l 2 4 5 6 Disagree 
agree strongly 
40. Most people just don't know what's good for them. 

























ATTITUDES AND INTERESTS. 
The following questions are to see what attitudes and interests you have. 
There is no "right" and "wrong" answers because everyone has the right 
to his own views. 
Record your answers on the answer sheet which you will find at the back 
of this questionnaire. You may tear it off and put an X on the a, b or 
c box, depending on which one you choose. 
When you answer, keep these four points in minds 
lo You are asked not to spend time pondering. Give the first, natural 
answer as it comes to you. Of course, the questions are too short 
to give you all the particulars you would sometimes like to have. 
For instance, the above question asks you about "team games" and 
you might be fonder of football than basketball. But you are to 
reply "for the average game", or to strike an average in situations 
of the kind stated. Give the best answer you can at a rate not 
slower than five or six a minute. You should finish in a little 
more than half an hour. 
2. Try 1121 to fall back on the middle, "uncertain" answers except when 
the answer at either end is really impossible for you - perhaps 
once every four or five questions. 
3. Be sure not to skip anything, but answer every question, somehow. 
Some may not apply to you very well, but give your best guess. 
Some may seem personal; but remember that the answer sheets are 
kept confidential and cannot be scored without a special stencil 
key. Answers to particular questions are not inspected. 
4. Answer as honestly as possible what is true of you. Do not merely 












1. I have the instructions for this test clearly in mind 0 
a. yes, b. uncertain, c. no. 
2. I am ready to answer each question as truthfully as possible. 
a. yes, b. uncertain, 
3o I would rather have a house: 
ao in a sociable suburb, 
b. in between, 
c. alone in the deep woods. 
c. noo 
4. I can find enough energy to face my difficulties. 
a. always, b. generally, c. seldomo 
5. I feel a bit nervous of wild animals even when they ~re in strong 
cages. 
a. yes (true), b. uncertain, c. no (false). 
6. I hold back from criticizing people and their ideas. 
a. yes, b. sometimes, c. no. 
7. I make smart, sarcastic remarks to people if I think they deserve it. 
a. generally, b. sometimes, c. never. 
8. I prefer semiclassical music to popular tunes. 
a. true, b. uncertain, c. false. 
9. If I saw two neighbors' children fighting, I woulds 
a. leave them to settle it, 
b. uncertain, 
Co reason with them. 
10. On social occasions I: 
a. readily come forward, 
b. in between, 
Co prefer to stay quietly in the background. 
11. It would be more interesting to bes 
a. a construction engineer, 
b. uncertain, 
c. a writer of plays. 
12. I would rather stop in the street to watch an artist painting than 
listen to some people having a quarrel. 
a. true, b. uncertain, c. falseo 
13. I can generally put up with conceited people, even though they brag 
or show they think too well of themselves. 












140 You can almost always notice on a man's face when he is dishonest. 
So yes, b. in between, Co no. 
l5o !t would be good for everyone if vacations (holidays) were longer 
and everyone ~ to take them. 
a. agree, b. uncertain, c. disagree. 
160 I would rather take the gamble of a job with possibly large but 
uneven earnings, than one with a steady, small salaryo 
a. yes, b. uncertain, c. no. 
170 I talk about my feelingst 
a. only if necessary, 
b. in between, 
c. readily, whenever I have a chance. 
18. Once in a while I have a sense of vague danger or sudden dread for 
reasons that I do not understand. 
. a. yes, b. in between, c. no • 
19. When criticized wrongly for something I did .!l2i do, I: 
a. have no feeling of guilt, 
b. in between, 
c. still feel a bit guilty. 
20. Money can buy almost everything. 
a. yes, b. uncertain, Co llOo 
21. My decisions are governed more by my: 
a. heart, 
bo feelings and reason equally, 
c. head. 
22. Most people would be happier if they lived more with their fellows 
and did the same things as others. 
ao yes, b. in between, c. no. 
23:~ I occasionally get puzzled, when looking in a mirror, as to which 
is my right and left. 
a .. true, b. uncertain, c. false. 
24. 'When talking, I like: 
a. to say things, just as they occur to me, 
b. in between, 
Co to get my thoughts well organized first. 
25. 'When something really makes me furious, I find I calm down again 
quite quickly. 












26. With the same hours and pay, it would be more interesting to bes 
a. a carpenter or cook, 
bo uncertain, 
c. a waiter in a good restaurant. 
27. I have been elected tos 
a. only a few offices, 
b. several, 
c. many offices. 
28. "Spade" is to "dig" as "knife" is tos 
ao sharp, b. cut, o. pointo 
290 I sometimes can't get to sleep because an idea keeps running through 
my mind. 
a. true, b. uncertain, Co false. 
30. In my personal life I reach the goals I set, almost all the time. 
a. true, b. uncertain, c. false. 
31. An out-dated law should be changeds 
ao only after considerable discussion, 
b. in between, 
o. promptly. 
32. I am uncomfortable when I work on a project requiring quick action 
affecting others. 
a. true, b. in between, o. false. 
33. Most of the people I know would rate me as an amusing talker. 
a. yes, b. uncertain, c. no. 
34. When I see "sloppy", untidy people, Is 
a. just accept it, 
b. in between, 
c. get disgusted and annoyed. 
35. I get slightly embarrassed if I suddenly become the focus of atten-
tion in a social group. 
a. yes, bo in between, Co no. 
36. I am always glad to join a large gathering, for example, a party, 
dance, or public meeting. 
a. yes, b. in between, c. no. 
37. In school I preferred (or prefer): 
a. music, 
b. uncertain, 












38. When I have been put in charge of something, I insist that my in-
structions are followed or else I resign. 
a. yes, b. sometimes, c. no. 
39. For parents, it is more important to: 
a. help their children develop their affections, 
b. in between, 
c. teach their children how to control emotions. 
40. In a group task I would rather: 
a. try to improve arrangements, 
bo in between, 
c. keep the records and see that rules are followed. 
41. I feel a need every now and then to engage in a tough physical activity. 
a. yes, b. in between, o. no. 
42. · I would rather mix with people than rough, rebellious individuals. 
a. yes, b. in between, o. no. 
43. I feel terribly dejected when people criticize me in a group. 
a. true, · b. in between, c. false. 
44. If I am called in by my boss, I: 
a. make it a chance to ask for something I want, 
b. in between, 
c. fear I've done something wrong. 
45. What this world needs is: 
a. more steady and "solid" citizens, 
b. uncertain, 
c. more "idealists" with plane for a. better world. 
46. I am always keenly aware of attempts at propaganda in things I read. 
a. yes, b. uncertain, c. no. 
47. As a teenager, I joined in school sports: 
a.. occasionally, 
bo fairly often, 
c. a great deal. 
480 I keep my room well organized, with things in known places almost 
all the time. 
a. yes, b. in between, c. no. 
49. I sometimes get in a state of tension and turmoil as I think of the 
day's happenings. 












50. I sometimes doubt whether people I am talking to are really interested 
in what I am saying. 
a. yes, b. in between, c. no. 
51. If I had to choose, I would rather be: 
ao a forester, 
bo uncertain, 
Co a high school teacher. 
52. For special holidays and birthdays, It 
ao like to give personal presents, 
b. uncertain, 
c. feel that buying pr~sente is a bit of a nuisance. 
530 "Tired" is to "work" as "proud" is tos 
a. smile, b. success, Co happy. 
54. Which of the following items ie different in kind from the otherss 
Bo Candle, bo moon, c. electric light. 
55. I have been let down by my friends: 
a. hardly ever, 
bo occasionally, 
c. quite a loto 
56. I have some characteristics in which I feel definitely superior to 
most people. 
ao yes, b. uncertain, c. no. 
57. When I get upset, I try hard to hide my feelings from others. 
a. true, b. in between, c. faleeo 
58. I like to go out to a show or entertainments 
a. more than once a week (more than average), 
bo about once a week (average), 
c. less than once a week (less than average). 
59. I think that plenty of freedom is more important than good manners 
and respect for the law. 
ao true, b. uncertain, Oo false. 
60. I tend to keep quiet in the presence of senior persons (people of 
greater experience, age, or rank). 
a. yes, bo in between, c. no. 
61. I find it hard to address or recite to a large group. 












62. I have a good sense of direction (find it easy to tell which is 
North, South, East, or West) when in a strange place. 
a. yes, b. in between, c. no. 
63. If someone got mad at me, I would: 
a. try to calm him down, 
b. uncertain, 
c. get irii tated. 
64. When I read an unfair magazine article, I am more inclined to forget 
it than to feel like "hitting back". 
a. true, b. uncertain, c. false. 
650 My memory tends td drop a lot of unimportant, trivial things, for 
example, names of streets or stores in town. 
a. yes, b. in between, c. no. 
660 I could enjoy the life of an animal doctor, handling disease and 
surgery of animals. 
a. yes, bo in between, c. no. 
67. I eat my food with gusto, not always so carefully and properly 
as some people. 
a. true, b. uncertain, Co false. 
680 There are times when I don't feel in the right mood to see anyone. 
a. very rarely, b. in between, c. quite often. 
690 People sometimes warn me that I show my excitement in voice and 
manner too obviously. 
ao yes, b. in between, o. no. 
70. As a teenager, if I differed in opinion from my parents, I usuallyt 
a. kept my own opinion, 
b. in between, 
c. accepted their authority. 
?lo I would prefer to have an office of my own, not sharing it with 
another person. 
a. yes, b. uncertain, c. no. 
72. I would rather enjoy life quietly in my own way than be admired for 
my achievements. 
a. true, b. uncertain, c. false. 
73. I feel mature·in most things. 












740 I find myself upset rather than helped by the kind of criticism that 
many people off er oneo 
a. often, b. occasionally, c. never. 
750 I am always able to keep the expression of my feelings under exact 
control. 
a. yes, b. in between, c. noo 
76a In starting a useful invention, I would prefers 
a. working on it in the laboratoryo 
b. uncertain, 
c. selling it to people. 
77. "Surprise" is to "strange'' as "fear" is to: 
a. brave, b. anxious, c. terrible. 
780 Which of the following fractions is not in the same class as the 
others? 
ao 3/7, b. 3/9, c. 3/11 
790 Some people seem to ignore or avoid me, although I don't know whyo 
·ao true, b. uncertain, Co false. 
80. People treat me less reasonably than my good intentions deserv~. 
a. often, b, occasionally, c. never. 
81. The use of foul language, even when it is not in a mixed group of 
men and women, still disgusts me. 
a. yes, b. in between, Co no, 
82. I have decidedly fewer friends than most people. 
a. yes, b. in between, c. no. 
830 I would hate to be where there .·wouldn't be a lot or people to talk to. 
a. true, b. uncertain, Co false. 
84. People sometimes call me careless, even though they think I'm a 
likeable person. 
a. yes, b. in between, Co no. 
85. "Stage-frig~t" in various social situations is something I have 
experienced: 
a. quite often, b. occasionally, Co hardly ever. 
860 When I am in a small group, I am content to sit back and let others 
do most of the talking. 













870 I prefer readings 
a. a realistic account of military or political battles, 
b, uncertain, 
Co a sensitive, imaginative novel. 
88. When bossy people try to "push me around", I do just the opposite 
of what they wish. 
a. yes, b. in between, c. no. 
890 Business superiors or members of my family, as a rule, find fault 
with me only when there is real cause. 
ao true, b. in between, c. false. 
90. In streets or stores, I dislike the way some persons stare at people. 
a. yes, b. in between, c. no. 
910 On a long journey, I would prefer to: 
a. read something profound, but interesting, 
b. uncertain, 
c. pass the time talking casually with a fellow passenger. 
92. In a situation which may become dangerous, I believe in making a fuss 
and speaking up even if calmness and politeness are lost. 
a. yes, b. in between, Co no. 
93. If acquaintances treat me badly and show they dislike me: 
a. it doesn't upset me a bit, 
b, in between, 
c. I tend to get downhearted. 
94. I find it embarrassing to have praise or compliments bestowed on mes 
a. yes, b. in between, c. noo 
95. I would rather have a job with: 
a. a fixed, certain salary, 
b. in between, 
c. a larger salary, which depended on my constantly persuading 
people I am worth it. 
960 To keep informed, I like: 
a. to discuss issues with people, 
b. in between, 
Co to rely on the actual news reports. 
97. I like to take an active part in social affairs, committee work, etc. 












98. In carrying out a task, I am not satisfied unless even the minor 
details s,re given close attention. 
a. true, b. in between, c. false. 
99. Quite small setbacks occasionally irritate me too much. 
a. yes, b. in between, c. no. 
100. I am always a sound sleeper, never walking or talking in my sleep0 
a. yes, b. in between, c. no. 
101. It would be more interesting to work in a business: 
ao talking to customers, 
b. ~n between, 
c. keeping office accounts and records. 
102. "Size" is to "length" as "dishonest" is to: 
a. prison, b.·sin, o. stealing. 
103. AB is to de as SR is to: 
a. qp, b. pq, c. tu. 
104. When people are unreasonable, I just: 
a. keep quiet, b. uncertain, o. despise them. 
105. If people talk loudly while I am listening to music, Is 
ao can keep my mind on the music and not be bothered, 
b. in between, 
c. find it spoils my enjoyment and annoys me. 
106. I think I am better described as: 
a. polite and quiet, 
b. in between, 
c. forceful. 
107. I attend social functi~na only when I have to, and stay away any 
other time. 
a. yes, b. uncertain, o. no. 
108 •. To be cautious and expect little is better than to be happy at 
heart, always expecting success. 
a. true, bo uncertain, o. false. 
109. In thinking of difficulties in my work, I: 
a. try to plan ahead, before I meet them, 
b. in between, 
o. assume I can handle them when they come. 
llOo I find it easy to mingle among people at a social gathering. 












lllo When a bit of diplomacy and persuasion are needed to get people 
moving, I am .generally the one asked to do it. 
a. yes, bo in between, c. no. 
112. It would be more interesting to be: 
a. a guidance worker helping young people find jobs, 
b. uncertain. 
c. a manager in efficiency engineering. 
113. If I am quite sure that a person is unjust or behaving selfishly, 
I show him up, even if it takes some trouble. 
a. yes, b. in between, c. noo 
114. I sometimes make foolish remarks in fun, just to surprise people 
and see what they will say. 
a. yes, b. in between, c. no. 
115. I would enjoy being a newspaper writer on drama, concerts, opera, etc. 
a. yes, b. uncertain, Co no. 
116. I never feel the urge to doodle e.nd fidget when kept sitting still 
at a meeting. 
a. true, b. uncertain, c. false. 
117. If someone tells me something which I know is wrong, I am more 
likely to say to myself: 
a. "He is a liar," 
b. in between, 
c. "Apparently he is misinformed." 
118. I feel some punishment is coming to me even when I have done nothing 
wrong. 
a. often, b. occasionally, c. never. 
119. The idea that sickness comes as much from mental as physical causes 
is ~uch exaggerated. 
a. yes:, b. in between, Co no. 
120. The pomp and splendor of any big state ceremony are things which 
should be preserved. 
a. yes, b. in between, c. no. 
121. It bothers me if people think I am being too unconventional or odd. 
Bo a lot, b. somewhat, c. not at allo 
122. In constructing something I would rather works 












123. I have periods when it's hard to stop a mood of self-pity. 
a. often, b. occasionally, c. never. 
124. Often I get angry with people too quickly. 
ao yes, b. in between, c. no. 
125. I can always change old habits without difficulty and without 
slipping back. 
a. yes, b. in between, c. no. 
126. If the earnings were the same, I would rather bes 
a. a lawyer, 
b. uncertain, 
c. a navigator or pilot. 
127. "Better" is to "worst" as "slower" is tos 
a. fast, b. beet, c. quickest. 
128. Which of the following should come next at the end of this row of 
letters: xooooxxoooxxx? 
a. oxxx, b. ooxx, Co XOOOo 
129. When the time comes for something I have planned and looked forward 
to, I occasionally do not feel up to going. 
a. true, b. in between, o. false. 
130. I can work carefully on most things without being bothered by 
people making a lot of noise around me: 
a. yes, b. in between, o. no. 
131. I occasionally tell strangers things that seem to me important, 
regardless of whether they ask about them. 
a. yes, b. in between, c. no. 
132. I spend much of my spare time talking with friends about social 
events enjoyed in the past. 
a. yes, b. in between, o. no. 
133. I enjoy doing "daring," foolhardy things "just for fun." 
a. yes, b. in between, c. no. 
134. I find the sight of an untidy room very annoying. 
a. yes, b. in between, o. no. 
135· I consider myself a very sociable, outgoing person. 
a. yes, b. in between, c. no. 
1360 In social contacts I: 
a. show my emotions as I wish, 
b. in between, 












137. I enjoy music that is: 
a. light, dry, and brisk, 
bo in between, 
Co emotional and sentimental. 
138. I admire the beauty of a poem more than that of a well-made gun. 
a. yes, b. u..TJ.certain, Co nOo 
1390 If a good remark of mine is passed by, I: 
a. let it go, 
b. in between, 
c. give people a chance to hear it again. 
140. I would like to work as a probation officer with criminals on 
parole. 
a. yes, b. in between, c. noo 
141. One should be careful about mixing with all kinds of strangers, 
since there are dangers Of infection and 80 Ono 
a. yes, b. uncertain, Co noo 
142. In travelling abroad, I would rather go on an expertly conducted 
tour than plan by myself th~ places I wish to visit. 
a. yes, b. uncertain, c. no. 
143. I am properly regarded as only a plodding, half-successful person. 
a. yes, b. uncertain, c. no. 
144. If people take advantage of my friendliness, I do not resent it 
and I soon forg t. 
a. true, bo uncertain, c. false. 
1450 · If a heated argument develop between other members taking part in 
a group discussion, I would: 
a. like to see a "winner," 
b. in between, 
c. wish that it would be smoothed over. 
J, /<-.e 
·~ 1460 I like to do my planning alone, without interruptions and sugges-
tions from others. 
a. yes, b. in between, c. noo 
147. I sometimes let my actions get swayed by feelings of jealousy. 
a. yes, b. in beheen, c. no. 
148. I believe firmly "the boss may nog always be right, but he always 
has the right to be boss." 












1490 I get tense as I think of all the things lying ahead of me. 
a. yes, b. sometimes, c. no. 
150. If people shout suggestions when I'm playing a game, it doesn't 
upset me. 
a. true, b. uncertain, c. false. 
151. It would be more interesting to be: 
a. an artist, 
bo uncertain, 
Co a secretary running a club. 
152. Which of the following words does not properly belong with the 
others? 
a. any, b. some, Co most. 
153. "Flame" is to "heat" as "rose" is to: 
a. thorn, bo red petals, Ca scent. 
1540 I have vivid dreams, disturbing my sleep. 
a. often, b. occasionally, c. practically nevero 
1550 If the odds are really against something's being a success, I still 
believe in taking the risk. 
a. yes, b. in between, c. no. 
156. I like it when I know so well what the group has to do that I 
naturally become the one in commando 
a. yes, b. in between, c. no. 
1570 I would rather dress with quiet correctness than with eye-catching 
personal style. 
a. true, b. uncertain, c. false. 
1580 An evening with a quiet hobby appeals to me more than a lively party. 
a. true, b. uncertain, c. false. 
1590 I close my mind to well-meant suggestions of others, even though 
I know I shouldn't. 
a. occasionally, b. hardly ever, c. never. 
1600 I always make it a point, in deciding anything, to refer to basic 
rules of right and wrong. 
a. yes, b. in between, c. no. 
161. I somewhat dislike having a group watch me at work. 
a. yes, b. in between, c. no. 
162. Because it is not always possible to get things done by gradual, 
reasonable methods, it is sometimes necessary to use force. 












163. In school I preferred (or prefer): 
a. English, bo uncertain, Co mathematics or arithmetic. 
164. I have sometimes been troubled by people's saying bad things about 
me behind my back, with no grounds at all. 
a. yes, b. uncertain, Co nOo 
165. Talk with ordinary, habit-bound, conventional peoples 
I 
ao is often quite interesting and has a lot to it, 
b. in between, 
c. annoys me because it deals with trifles and lacks depth. 
166. Some things make me so angry that I find it best not to speak. 
a. yes, b. in between, c. no. 
1670 In education, it is more important tos 
a. give the child enough affection, 
b. in between, 
c. have the child learn desirable habits and attitudes. 
1680 People regard me as a solid, undisturbed person, unmoved by ups 
and downs in circumstances. 
a. yes, bo in between, c. no. 
169. I think society should let reason lead it to new customs and throw 
aside old habits or mere traditions. 
a. yes, b. in between, c. no. 
170. I think it is more important in the modern world to solves 
a. the question of moral purpose, 
b. uncertain, 
c. the political difficulties. 
171. I learn better by: 
a. reading a well-written book, 
b. in between, 
c. joining a group discussion. 
172. I like to go my own way instead of acting on approved rules. 
a. true, b. uncertain, c. false. 
173· I like to wait till I am sure that what I am saying is correct, 
before I put forth an argument. 
a. always, b. generally, c. only if it's practicable. 
174. Small things sometimes "get on my nerves" unbearably, though I 
realize they are trivial. 












175. I .don't often say things on the spur of the moment that I greatly 
regret. 
a. true, b. uncertain, c. false. 
176. If asked to work with a charity drive, I would 
a. accept, b. uncertain, o. politely say I'm too busy. 
177. Which of the following words does not belong with the others? 
a. "wide, b. zigzag, c. straight. 
178. "Soon" is to "never" as "near" is to: 
a. nowhere, bo far, c. away. 
179. If I make an awkward social mistake, I can soon forget: it. 
a. yes, b. in between, c. no. 
180. I am known as an "idea man" who almost always puts forward some 
ideas on a problem. 
ao yas, b. in between, c. no. 
181. I think I am better at showing: 
a. nerve in meeting challenges, 
b. uncertain, 
c. tolerance of other people's wishes. 
182. I am considered a very enthusiastic person. 
a. yes, bo in between, Co nOo 
183. I like a job that offers change, variety, and travel, even if it 
involves some danger. 
a. yes, b. in between, Co no. 
1840 I am a fairly strict person, insisting on always doing things as 
correctly as possible. 
a. true, b. in between, c. false. 
185. I enjoy work that requires conscientious, exacting skills. 
a. yes, bo in between, Co nOo 
186. I'm the energetic type who keeps busy. 
a. yes, bo uncertain, c. no. 
187. I am sure there are no questions that I have skipped or failed 
to answer properly. 
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PERSONAL RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE. · 
Please indicate to what extent you agree by putting an X in the appro-
priate 0 . Try not to fall back on the middle "uncertain" answers 
too many times. 
l. . . * How often do you pray privately in places other than at Church? (D) 
D regularly Orairly regularly D occasionally D seldom/never 
2. How often do you ask God to forgive your sin? (D) 
0 regularly 0 fairly regularly 0 occasionally D seldom/never 
3. Private prayer is one of the most important and satisfying aspects 
of my religious experience. (D) 
D strongly agree D agree Odisagree 0 strongly disagree 
4o When you have decisions to make in your everyday life, how often 
do you try to find out what God wants you to do? (D)(G.S.) 
. 0 regularly 0 fairly regularly D occasionally D seldom/never 
5e I frequently feel very close to God in prayer, during public worship, 
or at important moments in my daily life. (D) 
0 strongly agree O _agree 0 disagree 0 strongly disagree 
6. How often have you taken Holy Communion (The Lord's Supper, The 
Eucharist) during the past year? (C.A.) 
0 regularly 0 fairly regtilarly 0 occasionally 0 seldom/never 
7o 
8. 
During the last year, how many Sundays per month on the 
you gone to a worship service? (C.A.)(Scoring reversed) 
0 none 01 0 2 03 or more. 
If not prevented by unavoidable circumstances, I attend 
0 more than once 0 about once 0 2 or 3 times 
a week a week a month 
average have 
Church: (C.A.) 
0 less than once 
a month 
9o How would you rate your activity in your congregation? (O.A.) 
Overy active 0 active D slight active 0 inactive 
I . 
10. How often do you spend evenings at Church meetings or in Church 
work? (O.Ao) 
0 regularly 0 fairly regularly D occasionally 0 seldom/never 
llo I enjoy working in the activities of the Church, (O.A.) 
0 atro ngly agree 0 agree 0 disagree 0 strongly disagree 
12. Church activities (meetings, committee work, etc.) are a major source 
of satisfaction in my life. (O.A.) 












13. I keep pretty well informed about my congregation and have some 
influence on its decisions. (0.A.) 
0 strongly agree 0 agree Ddisagree 0 strongly disagree 
14. List the church offices, committees, or jobs of any kind in which 
you served during the past 12 months: (O.A.) 
a): •...•.................... d) o ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
b)o••••••••••••••••••••••••e)o••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
0) •. 0 •••••••••••••••••••••• r) ............................. . 
15. Last year, approximately what per cent of your income was contri-
buted to the Church? (F) (Scoring reversed) 
D 1% or less. 0 2 - 4% D 5 - 9% 0 lo% or more 
16. How often do you read literature about your faith (or church)? (G.S.) 
r::J frequently c:J occasionally [:J rarely c::J never 
17. I make financial 
0 in regular 
planned 
amounts 
contributions to Church: (F) 
0 irregularly but 0 irregularly and D seldom or 
fairly often only occasionally never 
18. How often do you read the Bible? (G.S.)(B.) 
[] regularly [:J fairly regularly [:J occasionally r:::J seldom/never 
19. During the last year, what was your average monthly contribution 
towards your congregation and/or other Christian organizations? 
(F) (Scoring reversed). 
0. under Rl 0 under R5 0 RlO D above RlO 
20. In proportion to your income, do you consider that your contributions 
to the church are: (F) 
D generous 0 substantial 0 modest 0 small 
2lo I try hard to grow in understanding of what it means to live as a 
child of God. (G.S.) 
0 strongly agree 0 agree D disagree D strongly disagree 
22. During the last year, how often have you made contributions to the 
Church in addition to the general budget and Sunday School? (F) 
l:J regularly [:J fairly regularly c:J occasionally r:J never 
23. The amount of time I spend trying to grow in understanding of my 
faith is: (G.s.) 
0 very much 0 above average 0 not much 0 11 ttle or none 
24. I try hard to carry my religion over into all my other dealings 
.I' 
in life. (G.s.) 












25. How often in the last year have you shared with another christian 
the problems and joys of trying to live a life of faith in God?(B) 
c:J regularly c:J fairly frequently [=:J occasionallyc:J seldom/never 
260 How often have you personally tried to convert someone to faith in 
Jesus Christ (God)? (B) 
c=J' regularly c=J. fairly frequently [:J occasionally c:J seldom/never 
270 How often do you talk libout religion with your friends, neighbours, 
or fellow workers? (B) 
regularly fairly frequently occasionally seldom/never 
280 When faced by decisions regarding social problems, how often do you 
seek guidance from statements and publications provided by the 
Church? (B) 
D regularly 0 fairly ~requently 0 occasionally D seldom/never. 
29 •. ,How often rlo you talk with the pastor (or some other official) about 
some part of the worship service: e.g. the sermon, scripture, choice 
of hymns, etc. (B) . 
0 regularly 0 fairly frequently D occasionally 0 seldom/never 
30. During the last year, how often have you visited someone in need, 
besides your own relatives? (B) 
0 regularly 0 fairly frequently D occasionally 0 seldom/never 
* D a Devotionalism; C.A. = Church Attendance; O.Ao = Organizational 
Activity; F =Financial Support; G.S. =Growth and Striving; 
B = Talking and Reading about Religion (Behaviour)o 
